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Pa.n:l\ens captu~ed in border raids 
Indonesian troops violate PNG territory 
On.Aitgust 11-12, Indonesian troops raide(la West Papuan refugee camp in Papua New Guinea,killed 
five people, and captured several Papuans believed to be members of the Organisasi Papua Merdeka 
(OPM). Troops burned down this and other refugee camps, pro_mpting hundreds of Papuans, in fear 
for thejr lives, to t(Jke refuge at a PNG government post. The lives of West Papuans and Papua New 
Guineans are und~r threat from Indonesian attacks1 violating PNG's territorial integrity. 
A fe\i( ,days after .the attack on the Imnai refugee camp, in 
West Sepik province of PNG, the Indonesian authorities 
annoµnced the capture of eleven OPM suspects - avoiding 
any mention of where they were captured. The West 
Papuans, now in custody in Jayapura, are evidently the men 
who were captured in the Imnai refugee camp. The previous 
month, the Indonesian Trikora command am1ounced the 
arrest of OPM leader Mecky Salosa. He had been deported 
- in effect extradited - to West Papua on July 22, by the 
PNG. authorities. Now, with the capture of the .eleven, the 
military appears to .be taking PNG's Jaw into its own bands, 
by crossing the border and helping itself 1o OPM suspects. 
The attack was reported in a PNG newspaper, the Post 
Courier (16/8/90}. Quoting a "senior official", the Courier 
states that on August 11, there was a fierce mortar and gun 
battle between Illdonesian troops and OPM at Ok Bago, 1.5 
km into PNG, after which Indonesian troops burned down 
Imnai camp and captured several OPM suspects. Men who 
escaped the c.lash said that several other camps had also 
been torched. 
Deaths and ~bductions along border 
Reports indicate 1hat Indonesian troops have killed at leas! 
15 Papuaps during frequent border violations and clashes 
with OPM guerillas in the past .months. fn August, incur;-
sions beca111e an almost . daily occurrence. PNG civilians as 
well as West Papuan refugees have suffered gross abuse at 
the hands of t~e fndonesian troops. A chronology of the 
most serious incidents is given below: 
June 14, a West Papuan woman and her child living at 
Yapsei refugee camp were killed at point blank range by 
Indonesian soldie:rs. They had been attending their gardens 
at the time of the attack. [PNG Times 23/8/90] 
June 20, two West Papuan brothers also Jiving at the 
Yapsei campwere abducted by Uidcmesian . tr().o~: i(ine Was 
released on . condition he identify OPM • b.ases in PNG; the 
whereabouts of his 17-year old brother are µnknown. [PNO 
Time~ 23/8/90] 
WEST-PAPUA 
June ~' PNG authorities say people 5 villages on the PNG 
side and from Batum village on Indonesian side have been 
streaming into Y apsei government station during tJ1e past 
week in fear of Indonesian forces. Provincial police chief 
says he has received a report from one of his men, saying 
OPM has killed 3 Indonesian troops. [Post Courier 20/6/90] 
June 24, Indonesian platoon attempts to invade Yapsei 
station, but PNG troops arrive in time to prevent an attack. 
Three puma helicoptei5 believed to be in use by fndonesian 
forces. [Post Courier 517/90] 
July 15, ten Indonesian soldiers walk in to Scotchio village, 
Bkm inside . PNG and hold . {\Vo w.on~en at gun-point telling 
them to lead the way to nearby villages. Ten others raid 
Popa village, llan west of Scotchio, destroying property 
and gardens.[PNG Times 1917190 & Post Courier 25/7/90] 
July 25, PNG deputy prime minister Ted Diro told parlia-
ment he was investigating reports that 7 Papua New 
Guineans had been captured by Indonesian troops in West 
Sepik province, taken across the border and shot dead. 
[Post Courier 26/7/90] 
August 11/12, according to a "senior offic:ial", Indonesian 
troops killed 5 people, captured OPM suspects and burned 
down buildings at Imnai refugee camp. 650 refugees from 
camps flooded into Yapsei government station. More than 
150 troops estimated in the area. [Post Courier 16/8/90) 
August 14, Indonesian troops reported to be massing on the 
border and many peopJe fleeing border villages, West Sepik .. 
premier calls for help from PNG government. 
August 22, reports of more Indonesian troops moving 
towards Okma and Oksil areas in West Sepik province 
[Post-Courier 23/8/90] 
West Papuan refugees in PNG. 
Better alive than dead 
Fears for Meclcy Salosa, the OP M's .• comm!lnder for the 
Sorong-Manokwari region, are · fueJJ~d by a report that. the 
representative from the recently established International 
Red Cross office in Jayapura has been refused penniSsion 
to visit him. Some 1eporfs claim he is dead, but the signs 
are that the authorities will attempt to satisfy international 
opinion by being seen to act in ~ accordance with "due 
process" in bringing Salosa to trial {aJl the more so, given 
President Suharto's new "concern" for human rights - see 
separate)tem]. A tpal \VOuld set a precedent for future 
extraditfons from PNG, placing the fate of West Papuan 
refugees now in Papua New Guinea in jeopardy from ~he 
PNG authorities as well as from attacks by Indonesian 
troops. . . 
Similarly, the eleven captured m August, appear to be 
more valuable alive than dead to the Indonesian govern-
ment who ·has' 'announced that there is enough evidence 
agaidst fo bring them to trial. AH are ag;u~ed of involve-
ment in killings at Arso 1ransmigration •· site and in the 
independe#cc flag-raising ceremony of December 1988. 
This way, the Indonesian government can present itself as 
a state which. is based on the rule of law, 
However ther.e is gr.~tve concern for their safoty for, lik~ 
Salosa, they have been subjected to "intense interrogation" 
which can only mean torture. 
PNG announces new moves against OPM 
It was not uptiJ August 14 that the Port Moresby govern.,. 
ment could bring itself to issue a protest to Indonesia. The 
letter protesting Indonesian troop incursions . over the 
previous three days, but saying nothing of the deaths, came 
from an administration beset \Vith itS, own probJcms and 
clearly reluctant to antagonise Indonesia. Appeasement 
rather 'than protest has been the PNG's government's policy 
of late, borne out by the extradition of Mecky Salosa, 
which was recently described by Foreign Minister Michael 
Somare as ''a start". 'And Iar outweighing the protest lo 
Indonesia has been the ·announcement of new moves to 
cooperate with Indonesia in wiping out the OPM. On 30 
July, border discussions between the two governments were 
held in Jayapura where, it is thought, tbe fndonesians 
requested finner action by PNG against the OPM. 
Just over a fortnight late1, in what amounts to a green 
light for the worst kind of abu,s,e by both Indonesian and 
PNG troops, • Somare ao,np1mced ·that PNG defence · forces 
had. been sent to the border with orders 'to destroy rebeJ 
camps and attest; I:lrosccute and deport rebels found in 
PNG. The same action applied to "pennissive residents" 
known to be actively supporting the OPM cause. All 
border-crossers will be screened by government officials to 
sort out genuine refugees from illega1 border crossers, he 
sa~d. [PNG Tif,nes August 20~ 1990} A government patrol 
was duly sent :in to dose down the Yapsei refugee camp, 
bririg "genuine" refugees to the only camp which is offi-;-
cially recognised · at East Awin, and send tlmrest back to 
West Papua. PNG c!efence minister Ben Sabumei, said the 
new · measures were part of a coordin.aled plan with Indo-
nesia. He . had .this to say of the QPM "I'd like to talk to 
thein and tell them they . arc fighting a battle they will never . 
win". [The Age, August 20, 1990) · 
Mecky Salosa: deported or extradited? 
Mecky Salosa's "deportation" would be more accurately 
dcs(;ibed as an ex:tradition, although there is no extradition , 
treaty between Jakait~ and Port Moresby. Salosa had se~ed 
a short. jail term in 'PNG for . illegal possession of ~m1s, ·and 
on · ~i~ . release, had b9en .. r~-arrested on char~es 'of.illegal 
entry. The charge was diopped 'wheti it became clear he bad 
entered the country on ~~e invitation of PNG's security 
forces ' burtbr~e days Jitter, he was "deported" "Deport;; . 
atioi1" would mean· that Salosa committed a c.,-rime in PNG 
for which forcible repatriation was the punishment, but 
si.nce the charges w~re. d~oppcd, there was no apparent 
, f~ ~ "._ '. 
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justification for thiS., Instead be was taken to the border and 
immediately taken into custody bf the Indo~~sians as ;.a 
criminal - extradited :... probably on Indonesian Jecjuest, for 
his OPM activities. ' · 
International protest . . 
The extradition of . Mecky Sal9~51 a~9used a. s{on11 . ofprotyst 
from international hu111an rights groups. OPM lieadqua'rtcfs 
sent a letter of protest · to PNG Pdme: Minister .. Rabbi 
Namaliu accusing PNG ·of .failing to ·honour · hulnan rights 
and of breaking their p\\i]) law on political asylum; ·TAPOL 
wrote a strongly-worded letter to / the prime 'minister, 
accusing PNG of condemnigg M.{lcky Salosa '.' .. . to face 
certain maltreatment; punishment, oi>even death ... " at the 
hands of the Indqnesians and holding the government 
responsible for any harm' that rp.ay befall Salosa. The Anti-
--.. ~.; .. , 
WEST PAPtJA ::·· ;: ... . ··; 
Slavery Society called on the prime minister to use his 
good offices to secure Salosa's immediate release. In .a letter 
to Australian Fore_ign Minister Gareth Evans, the Australian 
West Papua Association asked the Australian government 
to seek an explanation of the deportation ·and its iiilplica..;: 
tions for other West Papuan OPM ,supporters ]iving·in PNG. 
In PNG, the CathOlic Commission for Justice and Peace 
challenged the PNG government on the legality ofSalosa's 
deportation, pointed out that international solicitors in the 
PNG Foreign Affairs department had advised against 
deporting Salosa, and asked why the UN High Commission 
for Refugees was not involved in the discussion. * 
'The' 1965 massacres 
More·· on U~· embassy. collusion 
Kathy _ Kadany'~ carefully researched article documen!ing 
us co11usio!l . in the massacres presided 'over . by .General 
Suharto in late ;1965 arid early 1966 [see TAPOL Bulletin 
No . . 100, Augµst 1990] has been challenged in mariy 
quarters. Several Indonesian generals have poured scorn . on 
the idea, that Jhey needed help from a11yone fo tr.ack · dpwn 
and diIIliriate hundreds of 'thousands of communists. ', . 
After keeping silent for more than'-two· monH~s, the New 
York Tim~$ [12)uly 1990] tried fodiScredit ;Kadiin~'s claim, 
in articles in th~ Washington Post and #{any other. US 
dailie~ in May this year, that senior US embaj>sy officials 
were, .· privy to .the activities of embassy offic.ial . RobeJt . 
Martens who gave some 5,000 names of communists. to the 
Indonesian 4rmy, and that they approved of this: at.a .time 
when the Jridoncsian ariny was e1igaged in a campaign ' of 
mass ' extermination. ·· · · · 
Ka9,51ne1~ , r~ponse has been to . ~ake avaifable to .. ill,any 
editor~ . in i:be vs, franscripts of sectio,ns .of her , ipterv~ewS, .19 
back tip her conclusions. [TAPOL also has a copy.] She fas 
placed a copy of her tape~ . in . the National Security ·· 
Archives, foi ac_cess by the general public. [Tempo, 4· 
August 1990] · · .· · · · 
US collusion ·· · . .. .. . . . . 
There is . no chsptiting thi ' capacity of . Ji1donesiari , anny 
inte]Jigence' ,to .. track .'ck)\VIl communists; . t4e: scafo',of .the , 
kiJ1ings (at l~~st a ,qµarter' ofa miJ1i?ft, . ~ven, acci>rdin~ .. to 
the . CIA) can hardly . have been affecte,d ,µi11ch by the 
provision ·of some five thousand names 'by the us epibassy,': 
But IJ'S col)µs~qn is. Jhe point at issue .and J(adane has' 
provc.n ,·this, beyond d~ubt. Hertransqipts sqow tb!lf the 
e~b:~ssf belie,ved, rightJyor_wrongly, ~h~tJh~ir contrio~tion · 
wa~ crucial to ~h.e. outcome. Her persistent iriter.view~g a1efo 
shqwed that the us embassy was pre-occupied during the 
lasCquarter of 1965 with the killings and wanted to be 
certain that the PKI had been physically eliminated. 
Proof of US collusion does not rest only witli the Kadane 
Tapes. Declassified . cable traffic between the US · embassy 
and the Staie Department · during the. months from 1 October 
19(?5 shows how' the 'emba8sy aided and abetted the ariny's 
death squads. Aceoraing to an embassv cable to 'the State 
Department' on 4 :November. 1965, "DCM [deputy chief of 
mission, Jack Lydm,an]made clear that embassy and USG 
generally sympathetie . with and ·admiring ' of what . ariny 
doing\ A collecti,?n. of some of the more ·revealing cable8 
llY illill1D~ 
, ARE Clean 
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has been circulated, along with a Memo, by Gabriel Kolko, 
historian and author of Confronting the Third World: US 
Foreign Policy 1945-1980. [Lengthy extracts from his 
chapter on Indonesia were published in TAPOL Bulletin No. 
95, October 1989] 
Yet, the declassified cables are only part of the story; 
many cables from the post September 1965 period have not 
been declassified and as Kolko states in his Memo of 13 
August 1990, 
All accounts of the US role in the period before Septem-
ber 30 suffer greatly from the fact that the relevant files 
covering US assessments and policy during July-September 
1965 have been closed completely to researchers. I, and 
other researchers I have consulted, · know of no topic or 
period for the 1945-68 era that has been (reated in such 
a systematic fashion to conceal essential infonnation. 
There is, for example, no hint in the cables declassified so 
far of the covert operation the CIA was engag~d in, to 
which attention has been drawn on many occasions by 
former CIA agent, Ralph McGehee. 
The Embassy's 'who's who' of the PKI 
The following excerpts from Kadane's interview of Jack 
Lydman, deputy chief of the US embassy at the time) give 
some idea of the activities of US embassy personnel at a 
time when Suharto's death squads were annihilating th(! 
Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). Talking t() Kadarie .on 
14 May 1990, Lydman .. m;1de no secret. of the embassy's 
support for the army's campaign .of extermination: 
Lydman:. But one thing .you do expect is that you're aware, 
particularly if you're the ambas5ador or bis deputy, . that 
you're aware of all the reporting that's going out of that 
embassy, because you're in charge of that embassy. 
Kadane: .I've had some long an~ very fruitful tajks with 
Bo\> [Martens] as well as others. He was the PKI expert par 
excellence, it seems to me [Lydman: Right!] of anyone 
maybe who ever lived. One of the things he told me he did 
was fill up many, many, many gaps in the biographical 
reporting of who was who in the PKL 
Lydman: Yes, I think he did. 
Kadane: And it appears also that Joe Lazarsky' (deputy CIA 
station chief at the embassy] and others h.ave said thaton 
occasion, the CIA added some of their information. [Lyd-
mao: Yes.] 
Kadane: It was a sort of pooled effort. [Lydmao: Yeah.] 
Kadane: And the names bad been sent bac~ to Washington 
[L: Right.] because there had not really been a clear idea of 
who were the active members ofthe party. 
Lydman: l think this was true .and also that, you know, as 
this scene developed in Indonesia and undeveloped after the 
coup itself, a Jot of fresh information, new infonnation 
about personalities ·came l!P. that we probably hadn't been 
aware of before, because a lot . of these PKI people at 
regional level may in fac.t have been the new names... that 
we hadn't tracked before. ·And Bob did a major job in 
identifying these people. 
Kadane: . Some have gone so far as to say th~t he had 
identified the infrastructure of the PKI, that is to say, the 
committees --
Lydman: I think he was pretty good at that. [K: Going 
down to the lower levels.] He probably did more to clarify 
PK! building ransacked in 1965. 
that than anybody. There is no >question about it, he did. 
Kadane: Going down to the regional and city organisations, 
SOBSI [the trade unions], Gerwani [the women's 
organisation]. 
Lydman: Oh yes, absolutel)'. WeU, . you must remember 
that the.re w~re three and a half million •member~ of PKI 
and its affiliated or&~nisations . . That's. a lot of people .... It's 
amazing, . the job .that Bob a.nd all the . people he worked 
with did. Absolutely remarkabl.e ... (A.) fantastic job. I don't 
know of ariy officer in a .time of ct.isis .who perform.ea . more 
brilliantly lhaJ1 Bob Martens. 
Kadane: Well, it 1Jll1led out to be useful, itseems, because 
one. of the things ~.e. told me was that these names were 
disseminated to KinrAdhyatman [aide to Adam Malik] [L: 
Yes.] who then gave them to Malik and Suharto's people so 
that' they had some way of identifying who these people 
were. 
Lydman: ram sure we helped .. a great deal in this, th11t Bob 
Martens with his analytical mind, probably provided a great 
service. 
Kadaoe: In. addition to that, others have to1d me that names 
came back from Su~art.o from Muttopo who Was gather-
ing ... , 
Lydman: Well, Ali (Murtopo) of course was the intelli-
gence chief -- I know of course that there were relations 
and networking going .on on that, but I can't remember how 
this one came out. I don't know for example Wh() WilS the 
principal .Fon1act with Ali, w,hethe, it \\'as WilfEtheJ [the. 
us ddem;e at1ache, now de~d] or somebody else. 
Kadane: Joe Lazarsky said he. met with him quite a bit. 
Lydm~n: I think Joe ~aybe ~id and. I think maybe Bob too. 
had direct relations with him, it's quite possible. I just can't 
remember it. 
Kadane: Well, Ali was the guy who .was in charge of 
gathering up in .~uharto's HQ• the names of people who had 
been caught or J<ille<f. {L: Yes.] And those names were then 
give~ back [L: Yeah.] I<> the einbaSsy and -- tbey 5 
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able to check off those names against Bob's list. 
Lydman: I don't remember that exact sequence but it's 
quite plausible. I did not focus on that. l was not an expert 
on these (word unclear] at alJ ~r,id had no intention of trying 
to become .one. · . . .. . · ,, 
K.adane:' WC'JJ, Ed Masters [chief, poJitical section 'and~ third 
man in the ef:nbassy] has said that there was cooperation at 
the lop of the embassy in focusing 9n this or supervising 
the whole aCtivity [checking o:t;f the riaines of victims] [L: 
Oh, yes.] And · that you all had discussed .i~ ·these names 
were given out .with the agreement of [L: .Oh; yes.] the top 
people of the embassy [L: Oh yes .] And that included you. · 
Lydman: Oh, absolutely. Oh, yes. 
[Later, the New .York Times interviewed Lycbnan on thts 
damning exchange, quoted in Kadane's 4aic1e. He tried to 
tone down his remarks to Ka~ne, . saying th_(lt this response 
was "ab,solutely not wh,at I in(erided ... I certqinly wasn't 
focus_ing on t.he impact". The Times saw this as :an example 
of Kadane's 'ambiguity'. , · · 
Watching ·_ the PKI being 'disman:tl~d' . . 
After Lydman described how rcp0rting at t~e embassy w'as 
coordin<).Jed at dailt, early morning st,aff ll1eetings, , the 
exchange went on: . 
Kad:Jne: So the bottom line., is this, it .seems to me. Bo.b 
Martens and his group . in the political sectio~ a:q9:_maybc 
soi:ne of the CIA people were able to :c- as· a result of)he 
names going out [L: Yeah.] and the ~<iI11es coming back in, 
were able to report that the organisatio11. qf .the PKI was 
being dismantled, over time. Was that right? Do you recall 
that? 
Lydman: Well, I don't recall tpat but I .think it'sperfectly 
plausible.... Of course, we knew · that, que to Bob's work. 
And a lot of other Inputs that were coming, .and things that 
we were learning from the Indonesians cons.tantly: We had 
an idea where the cracks were, and vie kne.w where .the 
fall-outs were, in the PKL We knew, for exampJC, 'when· 
the PKr ·almost collapsed in East Java. We knew when it 
collapsed in Central Java. 
Kadane: Oh, I see. That's fantastiC! 
Lydman: We knew when Aidit [PKf chairman] was killed 
and when Njoto [PKI second deputy chain11ari] was killed, 
We knew all of this. 
Kadane: But you're talking about the ma~norganisation [L: 
That's right. J when you say, 'It almost · coJJapsed.' 
Lydman: Well, the regional strnctures collapsed. 
Kadane: And you knew when that happened. . 
Lydman: Of course you did. WeJJ, you weren't entircJy 
sure that there weren't still some operating renmants,' 'iirit 
you knew that the main infrastructure had collapsed .... Now 
I don't know how much Bob could follow on what · one 
could call - uh - casualty figurts and identifica.tions~ ,.t 
think that there was a Jot that he could get from the reports 
that were coming in. But whether you could completely 
document that process, I rather doubt that, because a Jbf of 
these, sort of, local PKI colJapses ·were not that precisely 
identified as to who the precise casualties were. [K: The 
names of the individuals?] That1s right, these werenot all 
that... · · . 
Kadane: You might have, such . as, three Gerwani were 
arr~tcd and executed but you didn't know who the Gerwarii 
were. rs that what you mean by ·that? . 
Lydman: Well, that's possible. That's it. Certainly there 
were a lot of Gerwani who were elin1inated and nobody 
really knew ·who they were. They just disappeared ·off the 
screen. A lot of PKI did. But the names of the wel1-known 
people, I Jhinlc, Boq managed jo t~ack. Well, you talked to 
him, so he could tell you .whether or not he fo]t that he was 
tracking --
Kadane: He said he experienced some frustrations. [L: I'm 
· sure he did.] But · at the same time others in the embassy 
have said that over time, -they were able to calculate that the 
infrastructure had been destroyed. . . · 
Lydma9: . r think that that's true. [K: . It was . not imme~iate.J 
I think that that was true. But it took a long time. It took 
three or four months. . . 
Kadane: Yes, that's . righ( That's exactly what people 'have 
said. [L: They ~ouldn't do it right away.] Well, it took them 
a while to get to. everybody. ·· · · 
Lydman: That's right. 
Recording the slaughter 
A cable from th~ US emba~y to the State Department, on 
14 November 1965, of ·whic~ only the first page has bee11 
declassified, . includes an account of the killing .·. of ,$bme 
3,500' people in Kediri, Ea.st Java.,. These are the . kin? of 
people who, as Lydman put it, "disappeared off the screen". 
2. Slaughter at l(edi~i {Ea.$t Java]. American. missirmary 
froin Baptist Hospital Kediri told us that ,3460(photocopy 
unclear, could be 3400) PK! activists were killed by Ansor 
[youth wing of the Musli_m Natihqtµl Ulama p{lrty] with 
probable assis(ance from Marhdenist .. [nationalist party, . 
PNI] youths overperiod Nov 4 - Nov 9'. Accordin.g source, 
youth leaders had prepared list of victims. A/te{' seizing 
victim . concerned, they took /1.im . to riv.er bcmicy, w}Jere PIS! 
had allegedly prepared mass graves prior .Oct 1, · and,/;iif , 
his throat, Night of Nov . 7, youth gro11ps came icf hospitql 
and took away man being treated fo~. throat cut., Hospital 
personneltried to save victim, but told if they would not rpt 
not allow him to .be taken q}.vay, he woulq be killed in front 
of hospital. source also stated :Saine slaughter took place at 
Pares, 30 kilometers northeast of Kediri; 300 communi.S(s . 
reported killed there. 
A. Armed forces did nothing to. stop slaughter amJ in fact 
appare~,tly colluded with anti;...PK! youths and perhaps 
instigated t~em. . CqL JVelly Soedjono~ .. commander .. /for 
Madiun -:f(ediri arla, reported . by source io hav,e)~een in 
Kediri at time and tq have told youths hy sure they-·cou{d 
find more than 3500 comprunists . in , Kediri if they . really 
lookea. Soedjono reportedly' relative one of six ffiuidered · 
generals and press has reported him as giving hard..:.line 
anti-PK! briefings various areas his jurisdiction. , * 
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The de-Suharto-izati.on ,.of Suharto: 
Drastic changes seem .to be QC<("'rring in .Jakarta. Suharto ~<; spe~ch on 16 August, advos~tz:11g 
democracy . and pluralism has f}Xcited politician,s1 academ,ics,. students. an,d. the press. It looks a~<> if.the 
helmsman of the Indonesian state has fired the opening shot towards a new era, an era of democracy. 
What lies b~hind these latest moves of the c~lining fox? 
During the 25 years of Suharto's rule, his style of govemi:rig 
hi!S changed from 1ime to time whifo 'the personal ~l.des 
serving him have also changed. Suharto's most important 
asset as a dictator is his ability to switch policie~, adjust 1o 
new situations and anticipate the dangers 'fronr opponents, 
coup threats and so on. Suharto has eschewed rigidity, 
observing the changes around him and acting accordingly. 
Most dictators in recent history have fallen because of 
arrogance of power, This flaw in 'human nature results in 
mental flabbiness, making the ruler Jess alert. Failing to 
anticipate economic and political developments, many 
dictators have been swept aside by history. But Suharto is 
~iill on top, perhaps even stronger than ever. He has tume.d 
the Orde Baru regime from a military regime into a regime 
with a strong Suharto trademark. 
Fi;om a 1J1ilitary reghne toa Suharto regi!lle 
In 1965, at the beginning of the Orde Bgru; . Suharto 'neede~ 
aJJ th~ support he .could get to seize and consoJ.idate. power,. 
The common .tbeme with other groups in the am1y was 
hatred for the Pl(l, ·. the Itidonesiah Communi~t Party. A. 
ti~tly knit group of officers served him briJfomtly while 
hi~ inain political rival, the PKI, was obliterated and his 
group enjoyed the supporfof the other generals. This kind 
of military junta did not last Jong. Already in 1968, civilian 
groups like the banned politieal parties, PSI and 1iJasyumi, 
soon .realised . they had been misused by tlje military.- The . 
same · thing happened with the students; . their so-called 
coalition with ABRI, the armed forces, turned out to be an 
illusion. The gr9µp of generals . who became, kµown as the 
Orde Bane radisajs, like J;iharsono,> K~maJidris and Sarwo 
. '"~: 
The transformation o/Sulwrto: 
from military to "Civilian dictator. 
&!hie, were soon in conflict with Suharto who had no 
intention of going along with their proposal to overhaul the 
political structures; the destruction of the PKI and ·the 
unions was sufficient for the kind of law and order he 
wanted. Through years of setbacks and achievements, 
Suharto managed to get ·rid of every other group of gen:... 
erals. · 
In 1974 another major clash occurred, this t4ue with, the 
high-profile General Soemitrci, the second most powerful 
man in ··the coun,try, Soemitro lost the battle, "was publicly 
humiliated and stripped · of all his positiOns. Recently, 
Soemitro emerged from obscurity to head the conservative 
wing of anny opposition to Suharto. Then in the late 1970s, 
a powerful new group of dissidentgeuerals emerged, kriown 
as FOSKO TNI, backed by General Widodo, the anny chief 
of staff. The FOSKO group was heterogeneous; though 
poweifuJ / as individtials, it did not stand a chance against 
the determined .and ruthless Suharto. 
The period of restructuring 
His infamous 1980 speeches in Pakanbaru and Cijantung 
officially ended the co11solidation period of bis rule. All 
competing groups of officers were sidestepped and Suharto 
began the , Herculean task of overhauling the political and 
ideofogical structures. By 1985 1he formal political infra..:. 
structure of the country was fjnalised - all insti1uti6!1S and 
political entities were standardised, unified and Pancasila-
. ized. The three political parties bad to conform to the same 
set . of principles, along With . all trade unions, and wo:rrieri 
and youth organisations. Political restructuring proceeded 
relatively smoothly; criticism was suppressed by ttie new 
generation of officers under General Murdani. The . most 
difficult task now ' wak rcstrncturing ' the economy. ' 
From an oil to. a non-oil economy 
Up to 1985 Itic:loriesia was a typical third world country, 
relying primarily o~ . ~ts natural resources. As a major oil 
and gas producer, Indcmesia's n.ationa1 income relied. heavily 
on. thes9 two products, J'he 1985 slump in oil prices hit 
lndones,ia ~ard while efforts to · develop. an economy with a 
broa~er base were nqt entirely successful. Suharto and his 
team '. pf te,e,:lin.ocrats paved the way for .an export economy 
whi~h..' required a major over11aul of . the economy. The 
eco~omy .was,Jikea parasite, dependent on oil revenues arid 
foreign aid. In orqer ;to bqost market ;forces, many obstacles 
had to.;be removed, , pri}:narily bureaucratic, ,9bsiac]es (llld 
reguJat10ns. From 1987 on, deregulatory '· liberalisatioq 
i:ieas,}l:e.S, "7'ere introduced, followed by .. a bqqm. For.A the 
first }l.llle m Indonesian history, accumulatiqn of capital . 
occurred .on a large scale. ,Bu.t .the governil1ent's policy of 
e~ credit for . small tra<iers and businessmen . was , a. fia§CP 
and many smalJ vemui;es, collapsed. . ' ' ' ' ' 
The present boom is very different; free range has been 
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given to huge conglomerates which, together with a number 
of .new banks, have a stranglehold on the .ecsmomy. From 
a free-enterprise point of view, the Indonesian econOTI1Y is 
functioning well, even becoming .O,Velhe~te,d . . · Haviqg .· got 
through .the re~cturing of ihe e9onomy, Suharto .has had 
to prepare himself for a new era. Let us call iUhe period of 
the benefactor. 
Suharto, the benefactor? 
A comparison is often made with South Korea1s emergence 
as an industrial giant lt took .three dictators, Park;iChuhg 
Hee, the rigid law and order man (Suharto of thCseventies), 
Chun DoHwan, who streamlined the state apparatus 'fotthe 
take-off to ·industrialisation (Suharto of the eighties, 
restructuring the political institutiOns· and economy) and the 
enlightened dictator, Roh Tae Woo run11ing· a flourishing 
industrial nation (Suharto of the nineties, ,reducing authhri-
farian pressures by granting a few freedoms and trying to 
redistribuie wealth). What took Korea three · dictators •to 
accomplish, Suharto is detem1ined to:do single-handed as 
Indonesia joins the ranks of industrial nations. A Jot has 
changed in the last 25 years~ A snapshot comparison of 
1965 and 1990 wil1 reveal stark differences, particularly iii 
the economy. Suharto inherited an economy in tatters, with 
an inflation rate of 650%. Indonesia naw ·eiijoys eeo11omiC 
growth of around 7%. The Gulf crisis could boost growth 
even further though fnclonesia's present heavy reliance on 
tbc eAport of manufactured consumer goods couJd suffer 
badly from a Gulf-crisis induced world recession. Three 
years of economic boom have already brought drastic social 
changes in the big cities. Top corporate ma~agcrsaJld 
bankers appear weekly on/ the front Bages of glossy .maga-
zines. The public is exhorted to · adll1ire the corporate 
supremos, a trend noticable during the days of the 'casino 
ecof1omy' eighties of the US and .the l]E;. TJle .-tr?.ditiq:naJ 
view that getting-rich-quick Wil-!S only for . criminals. ~nd 
corruptors is fading. Success stories . of 'people like Tanri 
Abeng and Prajogo Pangestu are part of the ·reality for 
middle class teenager8. ,A .flood of white ·collar jobs with 
the new corporations has created a new :Class(.)~ profes::;ion-
a1s. More tha"l 10,000 Indonesians are attending courses and 
classes in the US, .many in banking, business adm,inistratiqn 
and computer practice. A new middle .¢las::;, is em,crgin& 
with lifestyles similar to their couI}tetpatts in Tokyo, Ni::w 
York ot London. · · · 
Four of .Suharto's chiklren have joined ~he . ranks ... rri 
corporate tycoons. In :rnany important . business . deals, U-oiii 
the buildiµg of toll-highvvays, 1he medi!=l .b11siness, shol?ping 
centres, petrochemicals, plywood and the clove mo:qppoly, 
the Suharto kids, are up :front and always ip tlie news. 
But there is a dark side in. the story. The · swift growth . of 
1he conglomerates has .•. created a. deep cleavage iii, s9ciety. 
The gap be.tW:een rich and poor .has never _be,en gi:e~ter . ;md 
tl1e big ·city sandal ~jepi1 (the . ,[r1donp$iaJ1 sµlf·:.~Ja,ss) .1s 
growing at ~n, explosive .ra,te. TJie cyI\ifi~m . and . bi~tei:Qe,s$ 
of the .. popr is obvious; ·the ne..v .consu1l1cr-m)nded m,i,dple 
class daily .P~~~de. their wealth jn the b;u$y ;.stree}i) . Qf .J a~~a: 
The greed of 1h.e Suharto family i~ . ? ·m~tt~r ()f ~it~f.r resent..: 
ment among the en1erging middle. <;J~ss: ... 111¢·. g9ssip at 
cocktail parties in iakarta is. primarily about the wrong:. 
doings of tl1e First Family. Th((rK .. , ~nt; sig11s .. of .a .11ew 
economic stratum, the 'm~<lgemerit class', a~lfto ' ta~e a 
stand independently of the e:xecutive and able t(j moveth.e 
economy forward or hold it back. The grip · uf the Fm{ 
family on the · e¢onomy is still relatively · tight· but tbe 
development of a· free enterpriSe capitalist ·society Will · · · · ·· 
. ' -- , .. i . . . , . . -~ 
Members of the elite club: Pa,ngesfu frayog0. with fbu Tien 
an~ her eldest daughter, Mbak Tutu(. ··. ····· · · .. · 
create new relations betw~en the corporate class and the 
executive. . 
The · first filgns of 'corporate independence' em~rged when 
Suharto came up with his masterc..sttoke to ·mstruct "the 
major conglomerates to hand over 25% of their share.s to 
cooperatives. This gesture caught the headlines for weeks, 
but the 31 tycoons SUIDillOned to Suharto's Tapos ranch 
were only prepared to off er 1 % of their shares. Interest in 
this gesture has faded and it is doubtful whether it has in 
the end made Suharto more popular. t 
- '';~here x1e~~ssaf)'; buys )oy~ffies · fiom Tudividuals ~nci ~: · 
T~'§!~<izji_~~ti?~< ·, :. . . -,: ,; :~; ,i·; :.. . ... ~.. .: _ · ... , ", ,_,, ... ;~' 
:. · : .. ;In Sep1e!Ilber,;, th~, news .:b>Qke..;. ~hat _Ballkcl)utq; bad :L 
· ~~1( th<i:New' o.reier's cre<litiiii.iy"i~.'a1 ~st'ak~.~~:::[:r.ak4.ria\ :~ 
-., ~¥~?i~.:9J.?.?.9f ': • \ ::. ~:' :- ': .: ·;_ ~· .~:< '~}·~.;-~ :~·:'~ ';: '''>:~"" 
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POLITICS 
Political reform 
rt has been argued in several se~1i-t1ax;s .r_ecently ttiat new 
openings in .the economy should be accompanied by a 
political thaw. Economic democracy shmdd go hand in 
hand with political democracy. It could be argued thatat 
present, the government is less heavy-handed than . before. 
The PPP conference in 1989 was allowecj to choose its own 
board and chairman. A more recent example is the conflict 
within IKADIN (Indonesian Lawyers i\ssociation) ended in 
humiliating defeat for the group endorsed ·by ·the Minister 
of Justice, General Ismael . Saleh. The apparent tela,xation 
for the press is another indication. The most recent thaw 
came with the announcement by Home M.inister General 
Rudini and Coordinatmg Minister Admiral Sudomo that the 
press was permitted to mention the 'Group of 50' (now 58). 
This green light led several papers to give . front page 
headlines to members of the Group wpen they g~eeted 
General Dharsono, the country's best:--known dissident, 
when he was released from prison. · 
It is arguable whether the new political openings ·· are 
really meant to last. It is undeniably true that Suharto is 
grad~ally losing his grip on sections of the a~cd forces 
and sections. of Golkar, the two pillars of his rule. The 
pre.sent political openings could wcJJ be the resu.lt ·of 
bickering at the top, but they do give more leeway for 
reforms. Some. argue that Suharto is still in control and is 
planning to make more economic and political openings. It 
is argued that in Suharto's cunning calculation, the current 
power pyramid could easily lead to his downfall, following 
in the footsteps of Nicolai Ceausescu and Samuel Doe. Su-
harto has probably been observing the low profile taken by 
General Chatichai Choonhavan of Thailand, where free 
ent~rprise has become the credo of the nation. But he is still 
far removed from Chatichai's posture and many doubt 
whether Suharto genuinely wants to pave the way to a more 
democratic society. 
The best way for him to preserve his empire, the wealth 
the Family acquired over the years, is .. the de-Suharto-
ization of himself. The process of dismantling 'Suharto' . by 
Suharto means a gradual shift towards image change. But 
knowing his capacity for cunning, his is unlikely to ·allow 
the pro-democracy movement 10 push thmgs too fav ,, * 
Tinkering with human rights 
In his Proclamation Day speech on 16 August, President Suharto spoke about the need for more open 
dialogue. "There is no nee(i to fear differences of opinion'~ he said, arguing that with the state 
ideology, Pancasila, now firmly e$tabli§hed as the sole ideology, there was room for differences of 
opinion to emerge. He even spoke about the need "to promote human rights'~ adding that this should 
not be interpreted as ref erring t~ "the rights, of individuals which ignore the interests of society, the 
nation and the state". · 
The mention of human rights has ~t commentators won-
dering whether the Suharto regime is aboµt to pursue a 
policy of openness, raising hopes that human rights abuses 
will now be on the political agenda. However~ recent 
developments do not encourage these hopes. 
Strike bail lifted? 
The first hint of some rights being restored came with an 
announcement from Manpower Minister Cosmos Batubara 
that a 1963 decree banning strikes bas been repeaJed. This 
led to press reports asserting that the ban on strikes has 
been lifted. Yet Batubara was quick to adc,l 1hat this did not 
mean that workers could now go on strike. He said Panca-
sila Industrial Relations have not been abaridoned., which 
means that disputes must be resolved · by consultation and 
consensus, not by strikes. [Kompas, 28 AU.gust 1990] 
The ·strike ban 'which Batubara lifted was con tamed in 
presidential decision No 123 of 1963 outlawmg strikes at 
'vital government projects'. Lifting the ban makes no differ-
ence since these projects have long been completed. 
A lawyer experienced in 1he operation of Indonesia's 
labour laws said the latest decision would make no differ-
ence to workers' rights. Syaniar Mahnida said that even 
though there is Dow DO Jaw or decree banning strikes, a 
1957 Jaw still in force makes it virtually impossible for 
workers to go on strike. They are required by law to 
exp1am m Writmg to their employers and to the regional 
board for the resolution of labour disputes their reason for 
planning strike action; they must also confinrt tqat they 
have had negotiations. She said one-day strikes often occur 
but not all-out strikes in the meaning of the law. [Kompas, 
31 August 1990] 
, The decision to lift the 1963 ban is almost certainly the 
result of pressure from . the US where the AFL\CIO has for 
years argued that labour Jaws in Indonesia are an obstacle 
to continuing GSP [Generalised System . of Preferences] 
status for Indonesian goods. A government delegation was 
recently in Washington for di~C)Jssions with members of 
Congress. a?out workers' rights. As if to curry favour with 
world op~.1on and protect foreign trade, Batub.ara claimed 
that revoking the 1963 ban is proofthat "Indonesia respects 
uni~ersal workers' rights". [Editor, 8.9.1990] · .. 
Censorship relaxed? 
Admiral Sudomo, Minister-Coordinator for Politi~! and 
Security Affairs _recently said that from now on there will 
be no more inki;ig out o! . items in publicatio.n,s frqn1 
ov~rseas. H~ admitted .that the prac:fice . only makys people 
cunous to find out what has been censored which can then 
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be photocopied and circulated. 
Sudomo also promised an end to what bas become known 
as the 'telephone culture', the. system whereby officials from 
the 1nformation Department or the security forces phone 
editors with 'advipe' .i 9~ what no~ tp pupJ_i~h. . . .:· 
1nfonnation Minist.er ijai:moko pid i10t sfian<' SudmlJ.o's . 
enthusiasm for gr~ater press freedom. For hl.m, the 'tek..::·' 
phone culture' (described by Tempo as "almost 100% 
effective"), is a form of "interaction" between the govern-
ment (and th¥ pryss. "W.e pon'J ppctice. ~11sor_ship, ''. · he 
declared, adding, .'.'We don'tneed)t 11~ the press has Jeai:n9d 
to censor itself .. 
Press coverage of the·Sudomo .promise w,as . ~cepticaI'.Ppe 
weekly referrccl to Jaws and regulations >Vhich _proh.ibitrt,he 
publication of infonnat!on decnled ·. to b.e in con.flig wit~ 
Pancasila, the 194~ Cons.tituJion,. govei:nmet1J pc@::y An.d 
anything considerecl a§> "disrupting p11blic order\ Jhe head 
of public relations at the Public Prosecutor's Office said a 
'clearing house' of officials from BA.KI1'fu l1~4 BAfS. (the 
two· intt<lligynce agc_n~is~s) an9 tl:g~ Dep4rlmemt.O,fin.fomia,:-: 
tion, examines what print material may Alld ,i11ay,, n,91 ,:be 
circulated .in Indonc,sia. The. ~t~.d Jorce$ public relati9ns 
chief, Brig. Gen. Nt}rh<1di .Punvosaputro v;;.a.s. Il1ore .blunt: 
"AsJong a,s the regulations .in force ha.Ye Jl()t been rppealed, 
censorship will continue," [Tenipo, LSeptembc,r] . 1y 
Pages 17 q,nd 18 of a mid:-August iS:Sue_p_f 1J.w.§'c:on01nist 
With an arttcJe about Suharto's re1at_io.11s with. th~ ·n.e:w. arµ:iy 
commanders, had bqen torn out, ;md a si111j.1ar item W9§ 
ren;ioved .from a recent issue of the Bong Kong-based Far 
Eastern Economic Review . . 
Unreported events . . . .x.ru·. 
At least two recent incidents .have not been reported 
anywhete ·· in the Indonesian .press: They are: · 
* A .demonstration of dozens of young people outside the 
presidential palace on 17 August carrying banners calling 
for an end to the Suharto presidency, an end to nepotism 
and the introduction of democratic rights. 
* A, pro-independence demonstration ifl,Dili on 4 Septem-
ber, at the end of a Catholic Mass. attended .· by · tens ,,of 
thousands of people [see separate item]. ": * 
TWO BOOKS ON 1965 BANNED 
- .· .. ~~)/ . , > ,~· ,::.:' .·.~? ':T :;: , ,. 
Two weeks after Singgfu, 1U1c newly-appointed Attorney-
Genera1 took office (following the sudden death of the 
previous incumbent), he announced that four more books 
have . been !Janned. Two· of the books .ar~ abo~tctJie eycnis 
of 1965 which . brought Suhano to power. , 
One · is tll.e .· rndone$jan . translation .· · of an ~rti.~l,e .· by .. I;'.eter 
Dale Scott, arguing that ,Suha.rto wa~ responsible for tl1e so-: 
called . abortive coup of l October 1965. Dale ,,Scott aJ§9 
produced evidence that financial l~:S ~.et:w.ee.q m,ajqr. US 
companies like Lockllee9 an~ Jndonesia.'s former p,resid,e11t, 
Sukarno, :were switched-Jo the Su.lla.rto . group s9111e .. time 
before . the . October 1965 events, indicating th11t circle~ in 
the US were , promoting his . plans to sei,ze,; power. The 
artide, entitled "The United States. and .the Overthrow of 
Sukarno, 1965.,-1967" was .; pµbl:ished in· Pacific ·A/fairs 
Vol.58, No. 2; Summer ,1985. , · 
The other banned 1965 book is 171e Devious Dalang, 
Sukarno and the So-calledU)itung ,Putsch which contains 
the alleged verbatim rycord of the iJl!errogation of a former 
personal aide ot ·· ·the late Presi_dent SU]{arno, Colonel 
Bambang S. Widjanarko, imp1i,cating ·s~amo in the 
October 1965 affair. The authenticity of the ve~batim record 
has long been challenged in .. th6, Netlierla:n~, where the 
book was first ·· published. Colonel Widjanai:ko has also 
condemned the book as a fraud and has since published his 
own memoirs about his . periocl of . se~vic.e with Sukarno. 
The two other boqks outlawed are)ress dipping collec-
tions by Petrus Ba.rnbang SiS'J{oyo. }feboh Ayat-Ayat Setan 
covers the response ,in the 1ndonesfan · press to Salman. 
Rushdie's Satanic Verses, while Geger Lampung dan Kaum 
Sempalan coJla~es pr~ss renorting' ontl-J~- f-ampung atrocity 
in February 1~S9'. Biswoyo bas publisheO. Il1any collections 
of press clippings ab9ut importan.t jncjden~~' all of which 
have been ba!lped. ' · · · · · '· · , · * 
Re-e~amining .. Jbe ex-tapols ... again! 
Two years before Indonesia next goes to the poJls, more 
than 1.4 million 'e;x ";"" .PK.:I' , suspects , .{Ire . to ~n.dergo 5e- · 
investigation to detemline their fitness to take ·p~rl in ·the 
country's 'Festival of Democracy'. As we pointed out two 
issues " ago ' [TAPOL Bulletin ·No . . 991• June ·. 1990], ; the 
government .ari:i:louncemcnt ,fo February .that<restrktions rori 
'ex""PKI' enfranchisement ,would be lifted was nothing more 
than a smoke-screen. ,. ·:;;.:c .,,, · 
All people classified as A, B or Cl; C2 ,and 9 wiff be 
investigated starting September Jhis year; . An idea ()f bow 
the system :will. work nation:"'"wide Jias .been giv.en,bY:Jhe 
authorities iii East Jav<J, . where 461,5QQ. people 'Vf.ill .be .,re-
exami.t1ed. The . exaniination •will t.ake . pJace. :at .'the ,vj}Jage 
level and the results will be. passed : up thrpµgh ·.th~ ,vwi.oqs 
lt-;veJg;. 'Of I'egional g9vern:men( to , th~ [CgiOP<!J ,stab:ijity 
agency, <BakqrsttmtJ.$da. .. (Qf wpich th~ ·•· regi0;11a,1 .. 111ilitaxy 
commander is chair), and ~hell.¢e)o tl}e provinci(ll.g9yerµ9r; 
tbe ·Millister of th~ ,Interior and tQe General El~.ctions 
Institute (LBU), , .. >.:? 
The fact that a 'PKI suspect' was permitted to vote in a 
preyfous . electiqn is. not taken. iµto} axount. ''If there are 
fudications that the" person has not' complied with the 
provisions, the fact tl1at she/he could vote last time round 
will .be re-considered," said , Bari Sugim:an, ,social• and 
political affairs chief . at the dnterior Department. , The 
national: and regional agencies . . in charge. of re::-:streening 
'PKI. suspects' include Ahe police ' forte, , -ther public 
prosecutor's office. andBakcrstanasda.~.. •>' · ..... , "· ,. 
While the new litsus regulation. places . ideological : control 
in· ,the·'hands .of . government · departinent~ ;_ .control ,over 'PKI 
suspects' remains in the : hands of the·, anny.'s national 
stability 11gency~ :_ What ·. it .,boils . down to is thahthe ;general 
election;> have become the pretext for the sy~urity; f o:rj;C~ to 
carry oµt _fjye-yearly screening of anyQne susp~cteci qf J~Kl 
membership or sympathies dati.t1g ba<;:k . 25 years. .i 
Source: Jawa fos 31.8.1990. and Surabaya Post,29.8.1990. 
Meanwhile, -simultaneously with 1he startof the screening 
of 'ex-PKI' in Ea~t Java, tbe./itsus.investig!'ltion oL : '.c:.:; ...'.~~~ 
Continued on p.19 
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Campus life to be liberalised? 
A government attempt to · pacify sfudents · Who · have for 
years been shackled by a ban ·on democratically-elected 
student bodies has boomeranged. In August the gove:tnlllent 
announced a new regulation on studeiit senates, presenting 
this as a move allowing the existence of bodies "of the 
students, for the students and by the students". But the new 
policy has already been widely rejected. 
The regulation will replace 1he policy introduced in 1978, 
after student unrest, when the government enacted ; ·it:> 
Normalisation of Campus Life (NKK); ' outlawing political 
activities on · campus, banning the eXisterice of democrati-
cally-elected students councils and placing all student 
bodies under the control of the university administration. · 
The regulation provides for stu.dent senates to be s.et up · at 
university level (at present they arc only pemut~ed at 
faculty level), composed of a variety of student ~od1es. ,on 
campus. In effect, the senates will only coordrnate the 
activities and interests of disparate bodies and not ·· be 
representative at an. Moreover, the senates w~l . ~till · be 
under the university administration, with respons1bil1ty for 
their activities in the · hands of the red or. 
Rejected by students 
Already several representative meetings of students have 
condemned the new regulaiion as the old policy dressed up 
in new clothes. The first to· come out against the policy was 
the Communications Forum of Student Senates at the 
University · of · fndonesia, Jakarta, which issued a statement 
signed by all but two , of the persons chairing the various 
faculty senates. [Kompas, 24.8.1990] A few days after the 
statement had beeh widely reported in the press, a 'correc-
tion' was circulated by the university, alleging that the 
statement was not legitimate because it had 'not been 
cleared with the rector. [Kompas, 27.8.1990) 
At Pajajaran University, Bandung, eleven senates also 
condemned tJ1e regulation for failing "1o accommodate (the 
principle of) student independence" and as "a government 
attempt at politica1 manipulation". {Kompas, 29.8.1990] 
Hariman Siregar, a 1978 student leader, called the new 
policy "irrelevant". It is not for government to regulate 
student organisations. "There is no need for · government 
interlerence. Students should be left to set up bodies as they 
wish." Harsh words also came from Koekeritsz (Ondos), . a 
student of the Bandung fnstitute of Technology who went 
on hunger-strike last year in protest against expulsions of 
many ITB students in August. "Students may ·elect members 
of these (new) senates yet supreme control is with the 
rector. So, what about the students' right to control things?" 
He saw the new move as proof that "the government is 
afraid of students becoming po.Jitical". [Kompas, 8.8.1990]* 
Move to Nusakembangan reversed 
At the beginning of September, eight students serving 
prison sentences in Bandung and Yogyakarta were secretly 
moved from their prisons late at night and transferred to the 
notorious Nusakembangan Prison IsJand in Central Java. 
News of the transfer aroused a storm ,of pro1est. The 
prisoners in Bandung were removed so quickly that they 
had no time to take a change of clothing O! ' a toothbrush. 
Neither their lawyers nor their families knew anything 
about the move. Student colleagues iii Bandung quickly 
took solidarity action, demanding the return of the prisoners 
to Kebon Waru-Prison. The two Yogyakarta students were 
hand-cuffed for the transfer. 
The Bandung students are from the Bandung Institute . of 
Technology (ITB) and were sentenced to three years each 
for participating in a protest against a visit to their campus 
by Interior Minister, General Rudini on 5 August 1989. 
[See TAPOL Bulletin No. 98, April 1990] Their sentences 
have now been upheld by the Supreme CourL The two from 
Yogyakarta, Barn bang Subomo and Bambang · Isti Nugroho, 
are serving seven years and eight years for . possessing 
leftwing literature and being members of a study group. 
Their sentences have also been upheld by the 'appealcourts. 
News of the transfer provoked such anarf reactions that 
• • 0 
a semor prison official at the Justice Department, , Baharu~ 
ddin Lopa, ordered the immed.iate return of the students.· He 
said Nusakembangan is intended for convicted prisoners 
serving more than five years. In any case1 only so-called 
'high security prisoners' are supposed to ·. be . sent · to Nusa-
kembangan, although as a deterrent, the government 
announced some time ago that people charged for corrup'"" 
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tion under the subversion Jaw would have to serve their 
sentences there. Located off the south coast of Central Java, 
Nusakembangan was used to hold thousands of ~ommunist 
suspects held without trial, after the 1965 crackdown. 
No offi~i~J ~xplana,tipI1 for t11.e mqve h.a~ \Jeep For.tl1<:;om-
i.ng though. th~ prison pffi¢ial in. charge 9f'the tr<.u)sf er from 
Bandung alleged that the six were involved in scuffles 
inside Kebon Waru Prison and were responsible for the 
destruction of prison . furniture.· According to our soUices, 
.Arnold Purba told fri9nds that he. caused '1:.fiflcas ,in priscm, 
as .11 pr9test because prisoners WGre getting foqd ~·o.rth Rp. 
900 ·a day, instead of the Rp. 1,350' allocated. An9ther 
possible expfanatiop is that at Kebon Waru,tliey maintained 
close Jinks with their student colleagues outside. According 
to one source, the transfer was ·a warning t9, stuq~pts 
outside, as opposition to 1he new government regulation on 
student senates gathers pace. . 
More 1han a dozen students from . the, Cpordination Body 
of Jakarta Students, went to. Parliament to call on MPs to 
take action .to reverseJhe m~we. · 
The retµrn of the prisoners is undoubtedly a. yictory; but 
the six in Bandung have not been returned to their original 
prison where visiting conditions were quite lax, .but have 
been split into two groups in separate prisons. The wqere~ 
STUDENT TR!ABS 
·'···· , . .,, -'t: .. .- •. , .. ,,, .... .,, , ,.;_,_ .... >.:• ,.., 
abouts of the Yogyakarta students foHowing their return 
froU). Nusakembangan is not known. 
Who gave the· order? 
Although the transfer was quickly reversed, the incident has 
become a topic of great . speculation. Initia11y, ,it was 
assumed that the Justice Minister, Ismail Saleh had secretly 
issued the . order. Lat~r, more. persistent rep0rt~ sµgges{ that 
the military command in · Bandung, under •. orders . from 
Bakorstanas in Jakarta, was behmd the move: Whatever the 
motive; a cover-up is now under way. A Justice Depart-
ment official in Yogyakarta has claimed that. the decision to 
move the two Bambangs happened quite independently; it 
was 'pure coincidence1 that it happened on .. the. same night. 
Colleagues of the prisoners say that Bakorsumasda is 
responsible for issuing permits if the prisoners want to 
make short home visits. This means that . the army . most 
probably ordered their transfer but now refuses to say why. 
On 18 September, students in Jakarta made a second visit 
to Parliament demanding a full investigation. * 
A trial . 3bout; boo a d talks 
The trial of the Yogyakarta student activist, Bonar Tigor 
Naipospos, known to his friends as Coki, who faces 
charges of subversion, sho\Vs the prosecution ina !Jelliger-
ent mood over the books he read, borrowed or Jent and the 
articles he used as topics for discussion in se.tnil!ars and 
study group meetings. There .is nothing else ofsubst?nce in 
the case. · 
At an early hearing, tl1e judges ordered one of the defence 
lawyers, l C. Princen to withdraw from the defence team as 
he was registered as a lawyer only in Jakarta. 
The prosecution called as Wit.nesses coUeagµ~s of the 
accused in the Palagan Stuqy Group, induding 'the two 
Bambangs who are now servirig heavy sentence$ forsimilar 
'crimes'. (Bambang Subono refused to testify because of ill-
health.) Coki had no objection to m9st of this evidence. 
What for the accused is normal .i.nteJJectual activity is being 
dished up by the prosecution as a dangerous act of subve-
rsion. Sarne prosecution evidence has b,een pretty ineffec-
tual. Take the writer anp essayist Emha AinunNajib, called 
by the prosecution. He spoke of discussions on several 
topics which the accused had a~tendeci . but he, Emh.a, .couJd 
not recollect much about hin1, ·He referred to a discussion 
at the Hatta Foundation Library in Y ogyakarta on the topic 
of nationalism. "fn my opinion, what (the accused) said was 
nothing out of the ordinary; ·much like what the other 
students said.'' [Kompas, 25.8.1990] 
Commenting on published articles used by the accused in 
discussion groups, G.vki asked, why, if he 'fY~ bying · 
accused for usiqg the articles, were the writers not in 1he 
dock as well? · 
Another prosecution witness was Hasyim Rahman, a 
director of . Hasta Mitra, the cotµpf!ny which . publishes the 
works of Pramoedya Ananta Toer. He denied 'ever meeting 
either Coki or B~mbang Subo_no, The rn.o~~ .. h~ co_uld ~ay 
was that he had 'answered an inquiry from . Bambang 
Subono . about books'. [Kedaulatan Rakyat, 21.8.1990] . 
Bonar Tigor Naipospo$ (rigft.t) ·with his rw> C01Jl_rade~,7in­
arms, Bambang lsti Nugroho (left) and Bqmba7Jg . Subono. 
While no 'limit was ·placed on the number of prosecution 
witnesse~, . the ~omt would allow . only 5 out of '18 def~hce 
Witnesses to , appear~ Three 'were lecturers in political 
s~~ence at(}a,djah}~fa,da Uni~ersity who all testified that. the 
sfady gro'up discussions were useful as a way of broad,ening 
people's outlooks. One, .the dean of the social and political 
sciences faculty, told the co;irt the accused .played an'active 
role in campus life and was above average as a student. 
One wonders what sentence the prosecution ·wn1 ~yinand, 
on the basis of such a flimsy case. ·· * 
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UN resolution on· human rights 
For the second year. running, on 30 August, the UN Sub-Commission · on the Prevention of 
Discrimination and Protection of· Minorities adopted a · resolution on East Timor. · Noting an 
international situation "conducive to, dialogue and negotiations as the most adequate.mean~ of resolving 
local, national and inter-state disputes'~ ·considering "that the people of East T.tmor con:tim~e to be 
subjected tO grOSS Violations 0/ hum{ln rights I~ and regretting "restrictions imposed by the . local military 
authorities upon the activities ofspecialised non-governmental organisations'~ the Sub-Commission: 
1. Welcomes and encourages the exercise by the Secre-
tary-General of his good offices as mandated by General 
Assembly resolution 37/30 of 23 November 1982 with a 
view to exploring the avenues for finding a comprehensive 
solution to the problem of East Tim or .. 
2. Requests the Indonesian authorities to facilitate . the 
access to the territory of international humanitarian and 
development organisations. · 
3. Appeals to all sides to exercise restraint and, guided by 
the spirit of dialogue and negotiations, to co-operate fully 
with the Secretary-Gyneral in the exercise of hj.s good 
offices with. a view ·· to findiJlg a · durabl_e settlement of . the 
conflict. · 
4. Recommends to the Commission that it consider,. _at its 
forty-seventh sessfon, the situation pertaiJling to t.iuman 
rights and fundamental freedoms in East Timor and to this 
purpose asks the Secretariat to transmit to the Commission 
all the reliable information received. 
Point 4 contains the most important addition to previous 
UN resolutions. Readers who obtain any well-documented 
infonnation about human rights abuses in East Timor 
should send it to the UN Secretariat in Geneva, UN Office 
at Geneva, Palais des Nations, CH"-1211 Geneva, Switzer-
land. 
Despite fran(ic lobbying by Indonesian diplomats 'who 
attended the _session as observers, the Sub-Commission 
which is composed of 26 independent experts from .all pyer 
the wodd, adopted the resolution by 14 vote8 to 9, with J 
abstention, two votes more in favour than last year. The · 
breakdown of the voting is not known as the decision was 
adopted py secret ballot. · 
Socialist International Resolution 
The SociaJlst International Council Meeting, held in Cairo 
on 22-23 May this year, adopted the following resolution 
on East Timor: 
New Musical Cassette 
East Timor remains an internationally unsolved problem. 
The occupation of East Timor has been condemned not 
only by the United Nations General Assembly Security 
Council but by many other international organisations. 
Human rights are daily violated: arbitrary imprisonment, 
deportation; forced resettlement, torture, summary execu-
tions, the absence of the right of association and of freedom 
of expression. 
The Final Declaration of the Dublin EEC Foreign Minis-
ters meeting last February recalls again the "disquieting 
reports of human rights violations" in East Timar. 
The Socialist Interna1iona] condemns the continuing 
violation of human rights and the destructipn of the cultural 
identity of the people of East Timor. 
The Socialist Int'ernational supports the right of self-
determinatiou of the people of East Timor. * 
.. ·~· 
Jose Ramos Horta: 
persistent East Tfmorese lobbyist at UN 
_East Timor: ..... STILL FIGHTING 
by: Agio Pereira 
Available from TAPOL 
Prize £ 6.50 incl. p&p 
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Testimony from refugees 
Several Timorese refugees, from Portugal and AustraHa, .wcre in G<;neva to give testimony at the lJN human rights sub-
commission. Among them was Eduardo da Costa who left .East Timor in June 'this year with the help of the fnternational Red 
Cross. From Melbourne, Emilia Pires, preside~t of t.he T:imorese Association of Victoria, was also present. 
Eduardo da Costa's e.xperiences since the Indonesian 
invasion have been bitter and painful: . 
* A') a soldier in the Portuguese army, he fled to the 
mountains when the invasion took place but was ,captured, 
along with his parents and three sisters, in 1979. 
* His sisters were raped by Indonesian soldiers a~d he was . 
forced to serve the troops as a bearer and a spy. 
* On a visit to Ainaro in 1982, he saw twenty persons 
being killed, among them a close . friend whose widow .was 
later raped. Another friend's body was dragged round the 
town behind an army vehicle and later burnt. 
* Horrified by what he saw, he joined an . underground 
group but was caught in August 1983 along wHh about five 
hundred others. 
* After interrogation and torture in Bali, ail the captives 
were returned to a prison in Dili; two colleagues had died 
from the maltreatment which in~luded electric shocks, 
cigarette burns on the genitals .<md beatings. 
* On 2 March 1984, he was tried with 42 others . The trial 
was a · farce; the defendants were told to answer all ques-
tions only with one word, 'Yes'. He was sen.tenced to seven 
years and transferred to Cipinang Prison, Jakarta, to. serve 
the sentence there. 
* On 11 March 1988, he was .returned to a prison in Dili. 
On two occasions, 7 April and 8 June that year, for~ign 
journalists visited the prison. J;he first time, he was afraid 
to say anything because . the Gemtan journalist was sur-
rounded by intelligence officers, yeteven ~o, he was later 
beaten. On the second occasion, he was removed from the 
prison to avoid meeting an Australian jouma}ist. .. 
* After his reJease on n July 1988, he continued to witness 
gross violations and · his home was checked three times a 
week by troops. He was refused ·· pennission to • return home 
to Alas to visit his parents whom he had not seen for seven 
years. 
* In conclusion, he told the Sub-Commission that his 
village of Debu-Ain of about a thousand inhabitants, bas 
been completely destroyed; the survivors now live in new 
villages built according to the Indonesian army's orders. 
Why no sanctions against Jakarta? 
Emilia Pires spoke under the item concerning South Africa, 
commenting on a report about sanctions. She noted th,at 
sanctions had played a major role in forcing . the · white 
minority to rethink its policies. The :imposition of sanctions 
against Iraq for its invasion of Kuwait was aJso essential 
It i.s only regrettable that in the past and in other 
circumstances, the major industrial powers did not take 
swift and effective measures that would have discouraged 
other aggressions.,. ·(T)he invasion and occupation of East · 
Timor, though condemned by the UN Security Cou.fJcil, 
were not followed by punitive measures that would have 
encouraged Indonesia to desist from further aggression. * 
Indonesia under pressure 
For the first time ever, a human rights activist came toGeneva from Indonesia to condemn human rights violations at home. 
Jaka Gumilar is an activist from the forestry conservation hetwork, SKEPHI, and the new human rights organisation, INFIGHT. 
Besides speaking in Geneva, he was also interviewed by the media. We a1sc reproduce an interview he gave to Radio 
Netherlands programme, S11ara Maluku. 
Speaking under the item agenda, on 'the realisation Of 
economic, social and cultural rig~ts', Gumilar said: 
Basic human rights are vidiated through the enactftient of 
unjust laws restricting ·the right to o~gan,ise, the right . of. 
assembly, freedom of speech, and the right to decent social 
services. These rights are systematically violated by an ap-
paratus of repression, with. laws that (!.tcfu4e pepple's[J~­
rticipation and benefit the ruling powers. A false cons-
ciousness has been created, based not on an a~areness of 
. . rights but only on obedience and duty. The militq.risatiqn of 
society has resulted in rigidity · and authoritarianism, 
producing a system that is bureg.ui:r(Uic, repressive ·and fascist. · ·~ · 
Referring in particular to the infringement of peopl~'.s 
collective and traditional rights, Gumilar said · Javanes"e 
transmigrants' homes and cpffee plantations had been burnt 
down in Pulau Panggung, South Sumatra, peasants in Cibo-
das, West Java were defending their Iandfrom being con-
verted into a golf-course, and similar struggles were taking 
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Haji "Poni:ke" Princen, staunch defender of human rights 
in Indonesia. 
factory on their land, were tried . and given 6-mqnth 
sentences. In July this year, hundreds of peasants, most of 
them elderly women, were fired upon by 1roops when they 
tried to re-occupy land which was illegally seized 23 years 
ago. 
He also spoke about the violation of)and rights by the 
World Bank-funded Kedung Ombo dam and urged the 
sub-commission to study this case as part of a general 
study it has undertaken regarding human rights violations 
resulting from World Bank pra<;tices. 
Along with the victims of these abuses, human rights 
activists, many of them students, are intimidated, beaten and 
taken to court for defending the rights . of oppressed 
peasants. These included the six Bandung Institute of 
Technology students sentenced to three years earlier this 
year and to the two Bambangs in Yogyakarta now serving 
seven- and eight-year sentences for participating in study 
groups to discuss the rights protected in the Intemationp.l 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. In 
concJusion) he said: 
This is what our rulers call DEMOKRASI PANCASILA .... 
This is a 'democracy' where exercising basic rights like 
freedorn ofjhought and free speech tands you in prison! 
Persecution of ex-tapols condemned 
Another submission at the Sub~Commission drew attention 
' to the violation of t11e civil rights of former, allegedly 
communist political prisoners. It was, said Jusfiq Hadjar; 
the fourth time this question has been raised \\-ith the UN 
in Geneva. Conditions for these victims had not improved; 
on the contrary, a new regulation issued in July this year 
[see separate ite.m on page 16] had fort?er bro~d~ned .the 
scope of these abuses. Said Hadjar, who. 1s an act1v1~t of t~e 
Netherlands-based Movement for Basic Human Rights m 
Indonesia: 
As thino-s now stand, one does not even have to be sus-
pected of having been a member (or the ·relative of a 
member) of the PK! (banned since 1966) to be said now to 
be 'under its influence'. One does not need to have read a 
single line of Marx, Lenin, Gramsc~ Mao, Guevara, Castro 
or whoever, to be labelled a communist in Indonesia .. .All 
you need do is express criticism of the government to get 
the label and lose your rights. 
He toJd the Sub-commission that an Indonesian diplornaf 
present at 1he session had warned himself and the oth~r 
Indonesian present that if they "continue to support the EaSt 
Timorese cause, our passports will be withdrawn" . 
Hadjar called on the Sub-Commission: 
1. to rehabilitate unconditiona11y all those who are sus-
pected as communists or suspected of being under alleged 
communist influence, and 
2. to end the witch-hunt. 
Princen again prevented from attending 
Indonesia's foremost huinan rights adivist, HajiJ.C Princen 
was once again prevented from leaving Indonesia to attend 
· the 1990 session of the UN human rights sub-
commission.He had been accredited to attend by th~ 
Manila-based Regional Council for Human Rights in 
Southeast Asia. * 
INFIGHT explained 
The following is Gumilar's interview on Suara Maluku: 
There are various human rights bodies in Indonesia, the Legal Aid Institute and others, working on human rights. What 
do you in Infight think aboutthem? · ·.· . ·. . . . · · · . . .. ..· ... 
They have done far less recently than before; very little of<substance, to defend human rights. This is why we dedded to set 
up fnfight. Take for instance, INGI [International NGO Forum on Indone;sia] which was ~et up by 13Jarge NGOs. They .said 
they wanted to take a criticaJ look at IGG_I .aid to ;ln9.Ppe&ia. But they h,a~~ never gone so far as to. raise human rights iss11~· 
They've held five annual meetings so . far but not on~e. have they discu~5-ed issues ljke political prisoner~, the rights of minority 
peoples, the Lampung Affair~ Tanjung Priok and East Timor. . . . . 
The Legal Aid Institute is well known as . an NGO that defends human rights. But I've not seen them defending PKI 
people, West Papua11s and others. ~s that tru.e? . , . · 
Some of these cases were defended by the fate Yap Thiam Hien. He took on these cases as defence lawyer, and did so quite 
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fearlessly. But such things haven't happening recently. I refer not only to people like communists but also to Muslim 
fundamentalists, ·· W~t Papuans, East Timor~se . ancl . so on. 
What is th~ composition of Infight? 
One component ~nsists of NGOs like the forestry ponse~y~tion organisation, SKEPHI, Princen'sJnstitute for the Defence of 
Human Rights, and others. Another consists of studeI,J.t and non-student activists in Bandung; Jakart~, Central and East Java, 
and now aJso in Bali. These pei>ple staunchly defend the human rights of many groups. The third component consists of basic 
groups, peasants and others in the countryside, :vhose land and other rights are being violated. 
The people we know best are Buyung Nasutioll and Mochtar Lubis. What do they think about Infight? 
I don't know but.what I do knq'o/ is that there is a lot of competition between NGOs, especially in Jakarta. Wbat I find strange 
is that they compete no.t about who can best defend human rights but about political interests, personal . interests and abo_ut 
money. Their behaviour is little better than the law of the jungle, They try to discredit groups we helped form, asserting that 
we have strong links with the Left in Europe. They say this everywhere, to discredit us. The effect is also to divert funds that 
might come our way. This is unfair and wrong. If we are supposed to be fighting for democracy, surely we should coope,rate 
with people of different outlooks. r dont know whether the people who originally set ING! up go along with all this: , 
Does Infight haYe an ideology of its own? 
We avoid this because . it . -w:ouJd narrow our ' appeal and close us off from other groups. We don't have a politiqal, line; our 
attitude in fighting for human rights must be open-minded and universal. We want to defend the rights of everyone, regardless 
of their beliefs, political convictfons or whatevyr. 
You are, I belieYe, the first Indonesian with an Indonesian passport to have spoken at a UN human rights commission 
in Geneva and attacked Indonesia. Do you think you will be able to return home? 
First, a correction.' I went to Geneva not to attack Indonesia. That's a negative approach. What I tried to do 'was to. give th.e 
facts. Whal we feel we mu.St do is speak out, speak theJruth and be prepared to take the consequences. If the government sees 
this as condemnation, so be it. I went to Geneva to talk about things that have actually happened. 
What did you talk.' about in Geneva? 
I spoke under Item 8 about Social, Economic and Cultural Rights. I spoke about traditiqqaJ rights and about the poHtical :rights 
of activists who have defended the rights of others. wha(do I mean by traditional rights? In Indonesia, there are various types 
of law related to the means of production of the peasants, in particular, land. There are variou~ kinds of tradjiio~al lav.r,, known 
in some places as ulayat; in other places they go by a different name. These laws perform a specific Junction, and ~hotjld q~ 
fully respected. Butthe government never takes such things into account. When it wants to take people's land, it just drives 
the occupants off and tells them to transmigrate. Often it gives compensatign far below the value of the land. Under traditional 
Jaw, t11ese people have a very strong legal case. Things qwned under tn1ditiona1 law are tumally owned collectively. There is 
also village land which is cultivated by village communes, not by individuals. 
What was the reaction in Geneva? . . .. . . . •.. · , > 
Though they didn't say so explicitly, it was obvious that Indonesian embassy people .'(<'yre not at all happy with what I did . . In 
discussions with me, they used arguments Which I candidly regard as tlµ"eats. But I stuck to the principle that what I 'o/as saying 
is true. I lrnow this means taking risks, but there's no struggle without ri§k,s· For instance .,.. this was before I had spoken - they 
apparently thought I would say something about East Timor, so they said: "You'd be!f~r not say anything aiJ()~t East Timor. 
It's a very sensitive question. If you talk about that, you run the risk of not being Able to return home." · · · 
What are your hopes for the future? . . . . .. . 
There is more space for demo.crntic activity in fodonesia today than before. ijo doubt this is primarily because ?f international 
developments and also because of pressures from the outside. The Portugue§e ambassador in Geneva tol.d :me the US:has begun 
to press Indonesia to respect human rights. So we want to work much more energetically to bring about democratic change 
in Indonesia. I think the greater space internally and pressure from abroad means that our friends overseas who are concerned 
about democratic rights in fndonesia should take advantage of an this. * 
"I'm going back to my home village. I've had enough of this terrible city life. 
Street hawkers are being squeezed out by conglomerates!" 
''But 1 want to go to the city. A farmer's life is wretched. The land is grabbed 
. for all kirnls of projects .... .! . 
Pi.ldran Rakyat 11 May 1990 
SAYA Milli Ml!Dik. SA)~ 1'1/UA;t 
' HA6iS fllWI' Pr 1<t71J< MA.v te /tDr1l. ,Jltf)/ 
PAY4H1 Jlliit l'l!fJAU!N(, f'5TANI f/IYAff,LllHl/NIV)/l 
/;5D·'1'/l,/'J -r'tfr!.OES;+J::. P/GH fJIC/!PtOk:_t fll.OY~K. .11'f/ 
/!'t>tJ(,ltJMtt<ATI .(, <!?."I • rT() . .. .. I' 
' . . 
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New regulations have been adopted'by the military a~thorittes regardt:fg ,the scre~~ing. anis~pervfst~h 
of alleged 'communist suspects'. The ,xegulations now .affect not only persons alleged to have been 
involved in the 'G30S/PKI' or to have 'fallen .'. under the influence'· of such people, but also people 
alleged to be involved 'in other']\irids ofactivztfes which conflict with.'fqncasi!ci, the Constitittion,the 
state arid the go~efnmel}t'. ; 
The 1G30S/PKI' Jab~i is .. ~sed .for many · millions . of 
Indonesians deen:led to have been members or sympathisers 
of the PKI or the many mass organisations outlawed in 
1965. Tl:~e regime alleges that the. PKI .was responsible for 
the 3p . September 1965. Movement lafown . as t~e G30S . ... 
H:ence,:by association, all these millions are deemed to have . 
been 'involved' (terlibat] in the G30S . . When making the 
new regulations pµblic, ~veraLseniorarmy officers strei,>syd 
that the authorities had -so far been able 'to track down 'only 
2 million' (according to some ac.cou.nts, 'only 1.6 million') 
of th~ 2,~ . milliOn . ,people. who "\Nefe in _the. Pfµ . or r<;:l,&te~ . 
mass . organisations, so anothe,r 18 riilllion, must still b,e 
found. [Jakarta Post, 20 Jti1y 1990] · 
General TT)' Sutrisno . - 1JJRI Commander 
Bakorstanai. diief (rzght) . 
• ~¥- ,. 
Casting the . net even wider 
The new regulations revise some' aspects of the anti-PKI 
persecution m~asures in force since Suharto came to power 
in 1965. General Try Sutrisno, chair of Bakorstana:s, : the 
Coordinating Body for Maintaining_ National S1ability which 
is responsible .for . drafting and 'implementing the new 
regulations, said: 
* The concepts 9f . 'c;Iean self .. (bersi~ (iiri) and 'ch~~n, 
environ111e11t' (br;~sil;l .1ingkurigan) · which .. caused · S,o ·_ mu~h 
confusion~ have now been sciappedand allsuspects will be 
investigated . 'case-by-case', regardless . 'of thefr family 
connections; · · . · · · 
* · .A ~ne~ . concept has been devised, namely 1under the 
influence . of (keterpenganthan). Pepple .W'6'1ld now .• ~e 
check~d , for . ~heir keterlibatan . Cinvolvement') in the 
G30S!PKI) o~ 'tpeir keterpengaruhan; · · · 
* Screening would no<J9nge! be called 'screening' (the 
English word. h(IS uptil now been usep) bu,t.would. be <;all,ed 
'special investigatiOn' (peneliiian khusus), a!Jbreviated. ·tp 
litsus; · 
* 'Special il1vestigations' wo~ld now be conducted no~ by 
~he security .agency (Kopkarr1tib in . the days · before 
· ~alwrstanas) . but by •heads .ot goyei:nment departments anp 
other govern~entc<?ffices. All employees would b~) (lffeCt~,~' 
some 3.6 million people. in all. Departmental heads would 
also be responsible for screenh1g people within ;their sphere 
of i~terest (lawyers in the case of .the Justice Departim:nt, 
journali~ts in th~ case . CJ~ the }nformaµon Depar1me11t, 
teachers in . the c.ase ... of the Education and Culture 
Department ~d SQ on) .as ,:wen as th~ relevant professio~a! 
bodies; . ·· · " " · · 
* Although Kopkani.tip regulatjons . have . nqv.i; l:)~yn 
, repealed, its dec,i~ion " regarding the ' ,classification . of 
communist suspects as A, ~ orQ c:aiegory still apply . 
. . T~e followin,~ Yxtr~cts a,re taken, from t]:i~ official English 
lr'!ll~lafipn of. t~~ . B~korst~11as . presS;'. re) ease, j~ued; on::J~,. 
July 1990, on the occasion of a meeting of litsus officials 
from all government departments. The release is an 
elucidation of Presidential Decision No 16, 1990 of 17 
April 1990 and contains an implementory instruction issued 
by Bakors1anas in July. It says that special investigation 
would be conducted 
tO: de_~e~mine the: degf_e'e. 'o(loYazi)i;.tuyd <J~edieni:e.... '(a,.nd 
would) ·· mclude studying 'different aspects of an individual's 
personal character, ·.· t!,i(lt is, his/~e_r life hislory, attitu,.de, 
activities, opinions diid.:the influence G30S!PKI has had on 
him/her. Should evidence be obtained . that indicdt'es 
G.30S!PKI involvement or influence, further steps will be 
·:·, ~> ('f'.'!i.\J.· 
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arranged !Jy the relevant Bakorstanas-related units. Also, 
should the special investigation reveal indicators of any 
influence by any other kinds of activities which conflict with 
Pqncasila, the Constitution, the state and the government, 
sanctions will be applied as specified in the relevant laws 
and regulations .... 
Basically,, all humans are affected by those with whom 
they interact in their environment. For this reas<:m, a 
Special Review [litsus] of each civil servant will be 
undertaken to check for interaction with persons involved 
in the G30S/PKI incident and with ·. supporters of 
communism, as such interaction can influence a person's 
own attitude, opinions and way of thinking such that an 
overall negative influence is effected on his/her sense of 
loyalty and obedience to Pancasila, the 1945 Constitution, 
State and Government. 
Basically, any person who has at any time through 
speech, action or writing an attitude or belief, expressed 
favour for the one-time PK!, for participants in the 
G30S!PKI or for the political convictions and strategies of 
the PK! or the G30S/PKI incident can be 'said to be 
involved in the G30S!PKI. 
Alarm 
Although standard reaction in Indonesia to official 
pronouncements against communists is usually enthusiiistiC, 
the new regulation has alarmed many people. The chief of 
the Civil Service Administration Board wanted .. to Jmow 
whether all the millions of civil servants would now have 
to be 're-screened'. The answer apparently is that screening 
will apply to job applicants and government employees 
about to be promoted. The three . parliamentary political 
groups fear . that the new regulation could act as a 'stone-
wa11' againstfreedom of thought. [They ignore the fact that 
the old one · did precisely that, for anyone suspected of 
leftwing views.] 
The weekly Editor warned that being related to ex-
communists or having oneself been involved during the 
G30S or during the 'epilogue' was no longer the only issue. 
People born after 1965 could now be suspect;' moreover, · the 
'epilogue' of the G30S now stretches to the present1day. The 
weekly pressed Colonel Saleh, chief Bakorstanas officer for 
screening, to say what would happen about people who 
study Marxism. "They can Study it at a library for purposes 
of comparison. But afterwards we will check to see whether 
they have been influenced." What about Bambang Isti 
Nugroho, sentenced to 8 years for reading the . books of 
Pramoedya Ananta Toer? When he has served his sentence, 
will he then be considered 'dean'? "In legal terms, yes, but 
ideologically, no," said Saleh. Would this be for lifo? "Not 
necessarily, unlike people who have been classified as a B""" 
category prisoner [tens of thousands of political prisoners 
were given this classification after 1965, meaning that they 
were deemed to have been indirectly involved in the G30S 
but never 1ried for lack of evidence]. The B-category will 
stick with them whatever they do." 
Saleh said .. the first stage of screening would be a 
'cleararn:;e test' [English term used] followed by an 
interview. "In making . our assessment, we will not just 
consider whether the answers are right or wrong but 
discover why people answer as they do. If they say it's 
bec:ause of their father, we will have to find out more about 
the father. Maybe he was away from home from 1965 till 
1970, so we will have .to investigate whether he ~as 
'involved'. That's when we classify the person as have been 
'influenced'. [Editor, 28 July) 
A young women, identified only as 'Sisha', told Editor 
,.: . . ~ ... ··-· ~ ... :. . 
1hat her father had been classified as 'PKI'. "The new 
regulation makes no difference; I will still be classified as 
Group III [a ne,w expression; perhaps she meant C3), 
meaning you've been influenced by the G30S/PKI after the 
event (in the epilogue). Tnat's why I'm just a housewife and 
have no intention of becoming a civil servant." Couldn't she 
apply for a job in the private sector? "If company managers 
are afraid to take on people like me, f will never get a job." 
So 11ow does General Try Sutrisno explain it all? Asked 
by Editor how 'influence' can be measured, be said: ''No 
problem! There will be methods and criteria. If children at 
school ge1 poor marks, they don 't go up.... It's just a 
question of maintaining vigilance." What about a young 
fellow who reads and keeps communist books; would he be 
suspect? "This depends on whether he discusses it with 
others. We can't afford to be careless, so books like this 
will continue to be censored .. .. " 
One organisation that is not bothered by the new 
regulation is the PWI (journalists' association). "We have 
been checking up on journalists like this for years aln~ady, 
with data from their editors," said PWI chair, Major-
General (retired) M Soegeng Widjaja. If a journalist has a 
PWI mem.bership card, her/his background is already clear. 
What about articles 'that have been influenced'? How would 
that be assessed? "By whether they cause public unrest", 
said Widjaja. The Journalists' Code obliges ~WI members 
to consider whether or not to publish · an item and the 
decision hinges on whether it could disturb people and 
whether it is true. Editorial chiefs cannot evade 
responsibility, he said. [Suara Karya, 28 July) 
Criticism 
Criticism has been voiced by the Legal Aid Foundation 
(YLBHI) chair, Abdul Hakim Garuda Nusantara, who .said 
that Bakorstanas had been given powers that belong only t9 
the courts. The regulation is 'too flexible' and can result in 
charges of subversion against . people merely for being 
critical. The regulation should be reviewed, he said, along 
with ma!Jy other laws restricling p91Hical rights. 
Arief Budiman, a lecturer in socfology at Satya Wacana 
University, said not.lling has changed in essence;ol11y the 
wording is different. "Anyone cari be hit now. The criterion 
'clean-envin:mment' was at . least specific; 'having been 
influenced by' is .very unclear." Rizal Mallarangeng, a 
lecturer at Gadjah ~ada University, was more blunt: "Our 
happiness has beenshort-lived. Nothing has changed. The 
new regulation merely reflects the continuing traull1.~ :<\~out 
communism. It's this Jrn:ullia that preserves tbe,legitimacy 
of those in power,'' [Editor; · 28 July 1990 .. 
"Not everyone niay· study communism" 
The chief of the state indoctrination . agency, BP .... 7,_ Oe~ojo 
Oesman believes that 1101 all iqembers of society may study 
Marxism-Leninism. It should only be studied in order to 
understanq it as something dangerou~» , with >all its 
characteristics, but not as .. <l 'teaching'. Ifs study . should be 
restricted to institutes of higher . learning and cei:tain other 
forums. He . would have no truck with the .. idea that, with 
glasnost and perestroika, Marxism had basiCa11y changed.. 
Nor would he ~ ihat the chan_ges in 1he Soviet Union 
and Eastern Europe meant ·that Marxism is now b<mkrupt. 
Great vigilance was still requll'ed because the changes had 
not affected its ideological content, only its "ideo-praxis". 
[Suara Karya 8.8.1990] * 
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POLITICS._ 
Petition calls on Suharto , to retire in 1993 
Dissident general released 
. . . . 
Two recent events} a Petition signed by 58 people, calling on Suh~rto not to stand for a sixth term~ and 
the release of Lieut. Gen. (retired) HR Dharsono after serving rn'or~ than five yea:,s on SU;bversion 
charges, are likely to -raise the temperature ofpolitical debate in lndpnesia in the pen9d leading to (he 
1992 general e(ection and the .presid,ential election in 199 3. They will undoubtedly affecUhe prospects of the 
pro-democracy movement which is now taking shape. 
The Petition signatories include ten of the original signa-
tories of the Petition-of-SO statement which first criticised 
Suharto in 1980. All the 1980 signatories were black,liSfod 
and a total press ban was placed on their statenieJ,ltS. Now 
the group which goes by the. name, Petisi 50 has branches 
in several cities and can be see as being a politjcalparty .m 
embryo. Several members or associates }Ve!e tried following 
the Tanjung Priok massacre .in September 1984, Il10~t of 
whom are still in pris91i Dharsono, who w~sreleased from 
prison on 16 September, was not a signatorf in 1980 but he 
drew close io the group and . was charged with subyersion 
because of his involvement in draftj.ng the .Group's White 
Paper published in the wake of the Tanjung Priok Affair. 
in its latest statement issued on 14 August, 'the Group says 
that "since President Suharto has held his position for five 
consecutive terms which will add up to a quarter pf a 
century in 1993, this should be considered more than 
enough, to pave the way for renewal efforts; . further, it 
should be stipulated that future presidents may .hold the post 
for no more thantwo terms". · 
The statement calls. for a speedy e~d to all extra-constitu-
tional emergency powers and :insists that all repre~~ptative 
bodies [the people's consultative assembly - MPR - and tµe 
national and reg~?nal legislative as~emblie~J should cpn~f$t 
D/iarsono (left) just before h4 release, wit Oesman . ,a/ 
Hamidy, 76 years (ce,ntre) serving an 8~year sente11ce, and 
H.M. Sanusi1 68 years, serving 2.0 years. Both were 
arrested and tried following the Tanjung Priok massacre. 
only of members chosen at general elections [which ,would · 
end the _presence of presidential appointees]. All la~s and 
regulations . which do . not . conform with basic human rights 
and the principle of people's . sovereignty should be 
replaced, it says. . 
The 58 signatories includes academics, several retued 
anned forces officers, fonner politicaJ party leaders ~s . well 
as Ci few well-known human . ,,rights adivists and _student 
leaders · 
In prafae. of liber~l demQcracy 
Lieut.General (retired) Ali Sadikin, the leading exponent of 
the Petisi group, sp~aldng at the launch of the 14 August 
statement, caJJed fqr a close examination .. of 1he political 
structure during the period of parliamentary democracy in 
Indonesia (1950 - 1959). That this was . a period of crisis 
W,as nothing unusual for a country ]earning · to 11m ·· an 
independent politkal system . . But the crisis situatiQn has 
been used to discredit the liberaJ multi-party system. 
Setting the tone for a campaign to press for. a p1uraJist 
political structure, Sadikin said that the problems that.arose 
led to the i1Il.pesition oLcentralised leadership. He chal-
lenged · 1he belief that nothing had bee.n achieved during 
Indonesia's . brief exper,ience ofliberal dem.ocracy. Identify-
ing this period . as one of frequent cabinet changes was 
l;leside the point. Countries in Europe (Italy, for instance) 
have had to cope with numerous cabinet changes but have 
m,a.r.iage_d to build very successful economies. 
Although 'Indonesia's C:onstituent Assembly was near to 
completing its worlc. in 1959, it was made to appear: asdf it 
had failed because of the unsatisfactory nature of the multi-
party system. ·The · fesponsibility for this. rests with. civilian 
and military groups . w!Jich pushed for the establishm~nt of 
Guided Democracy in July 1959 which lasted till 1965. 
Nasution's . conversion? 
.Although Sad.ikin named .no names, the two m.en most 
responsible for foisting Guided Democracy on the coun1ty 
fa 1959 were President Sukarno ru1d General Nasution, then 
army chief- of-staff; •Yet, Nasution, now retired; is one ()f 
three senior figilres who drew up a document used as the 
basis for the Petition-of_;58's recent statement. The doci!~ 
ment, Bigned by Nasuiion, Mohamad Natsir; former M:isp·· 
umi (Muslim party) .leader and H.M. SaniJSi Hatdjadirtatii~ ' 
fonrre~ly of the Nationalist Party {PNI) deals at some length 
with . the iniquities of the ptesent party system ~nd 'the 
composition · •of :represent11tive bodies under· Suharto·. Only 
40. per cent ·of MPru members, · the body whiclf formuJates 
state policy and elects the president, are eleded; 33 petce"nt 
' ·,,' .;. · , 
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are presidential appointees and the remainder are chosen ex 
officio. The three men are highly critical of the present 
party system which allows the existence of only three 
parties, and the requirement that all election C<jildidates .. 
must be screened by the security ~pp~r?tUS . Many groupsjn . 
society are not represented at au. A)_though the idea is vot 
spelt out in' as many words, tbe document present argu-
ments for the restoration of a multi-party system. This is a 
remarkal:He reversal for a man like Nasution whb, as anny 
leader in 1952, tried on 17 October of that year to force 
Sukarno to dissolve parliament and who, in 1959, put 
pressure on Sukarno fo dissolve the Constituent Assembly 
and adopt the 1945 Constitution · instead of the · draft 
Constitution which the .Assembly, ·· a body elected By 
universal franchise, had almost cmhpleted. 
Huge crow9.$ welcome Dh;;ttso,no .. .. 
,A hµge crow~, several thousand ~tro#g, ledJ;ly A]i Sadikin 
and othe.r :memb.ers of .the Petisi group, was outsJde Cipi-
nang Prison to. welconH~. Dharsg110 on: his rele.ase .. Among 
the many banners unfurled, sorrie hailed hinl asJ'Indonesia's 
nen preside,nt". All other crow'd . gather~d . in Bandung 
outside his home. 
Among the welcoming crowd :>*'.ere students ftom Ban-
dung representing the recently,.-formed Students Solidarity 
in Defence of Human rights. Some groups carried anti-
government banners which w.ere confisqat~d .by · security 
forces and one student was taken away for · qu~stioning. 
In an attempt to sabotage the welcome, the piison author-
ities order~d Dh~rsono .to leave the prison four ljqurs earlier 
than planned but he refused to c6mply: . . . . . 
The Jakarta · • milit<try · . . command had issued -'~!' warning 
against big street demonstrations to. welcome J:)h.arsono and 
called .on . the publ,ic 'not to politicise' the . 9~G<1sion . The 
wammg was given prc)minente in the ,afln.ed forces news-
paper, Angkaf(ln. Jjersenjata. Am1y leaders -ar~ well aware 
that Dharsono, . ·a former comm~n9er of • the Siliwangi 
Division, one of Indonesia's most "prestigious . military 
divisions, still enjoys the respect of many offtcers: 
Dharsono served 5 years a.Iid eight months of a.se.ven-year 
sentence, having bee!) given regular remission/ entitlement 
and . a;, little e~tra "for . goo9 behaviour''. f!if 'ten-year 
sentence was reduced pn · appeal ·to seven years. 
Dharsono and the pro-democracy 1.Jloyemenf 
Dharsono's conversion from repressive army commander to 
pro-democracy leader came about following his dismissal 
by Suharto because of a disagreement over the re-structur-
ing of the poli1ical party system in the late 1960s. While 
Suharto wanted to retain the existing political parties (minus 
the PKI), 1reating thell1, in the Guided Demqcracy traditi~n. 
to a further dose of 'simplification' by forcing them to 
merge into two parties [!he PPP and the PDI], Dharsono 
favoured !he dismantlement of all the parties, to be replaced 
by a US-style two party system. Many other arm{ cs:m1;: 
ma.nders besides Dbarsono,, whoconfribtited sig11ifica!ftlY 1() 
the . bloody anti-left crackdown in 1965 whiyh !)rpught 
Suh<U'to to power, fell foul of th~ New .Order dicti;~orand 
joined the ranks of what becamp . known as B:arisan Sa!dt 
Haii, . 'th¢ diSgrnntled bfig<tde '. ··' 
Dharsono was one of four army c:ommanders .inJava who 
made up the core of anti-left am1ed militancy; their iioops 
helped Suharto gain control of Jak;i.rta on 1.0<;tober .. J.965. 
and helped him crush the rebellio.us lJntung gr~up .. at its 
base in Halim on the following day, Dharsono and other 
anny commanders like Sarwo Edhie ( comman.der of the 
PDL11!1Es _{ :,•··· 
------
RPKAD red-beret command()s), 13rig.Genera1 Yasin, 
commander .of · the . E~st Java ·military command, Brig. 
GeJ"leral Amir Machmud; Jakarta military commander, and 
Brig. General Kemal Idris from Kostrad, the army's Stra-
tegic Reserve corps, aU sent out their troops to destroy the 
communist party and associated ·. mass organisations by· 
means of round-ups and mass killmgs. They soon became 
known as the Orde Baru Hard-Liners, pressing Suharto to 
take firm action against Sukarno(whfoh he, be:irig ·a mote 
subtle politician, refused to do). 
After losing his job as Siliwangi · commander, · Dharsono 
was shunted off as ambassador to Bangkok and the:h Seotll; 
in the mid-1970s, he was appointed Secretary 'General of 
ASEAN but was filed for speakilig af a meeting of students 
during the 1978 student movement Later, he threw iri his · 
lot with the Petisi group. With the help of a powerfl.ll . team 
of lawyers, Jed by Adnan Buyung Nasution, he conducted 
a vigorous de,fence at his trial in 1985, attempting unsuc-
cessfully to expose the provocations of the army which 
preceded the shooting down of many doiens of Muslim 
protest,ers in Tanjung Priok. The trial added considerably to 
his stanwng as a popular figure and a victim of New Order 
:in j us ti ce. 
With such antecedents, Dharsono enjoys much credibility 
in the army and could prove a formidable rival 'to Suharto 
were he to become the Petisi's alternative to Suharto's 
candidacy in the 1993 presidential election. * 
Protest against arms sales 
On June 19, a number of concemed human rights 
organisations based in the, UK including TAPOL, wrote to 
British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd, to protest againSt 
the new anus deals · concltided between British companies 
and Indonesia [see TAPOL Bulletin No 99]. The letter 
argued that such weapons could only reinforce the 
capability of Indonesian forces and their dperations in West 
Papua .and East Timor ...., insurgencies ad1llitted to exist by 
the British government. R.C. Cook of the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office responded by first stating that the 
government's arms export policy is based on the right ·of 
other countries, as sovereign states, to protect . . their · 
indpendence {ignorh1g the fact that IndQnesia .uses such 
arms in its suppression of a territory that even the ·UK 
government does not officiaHy recognise as ,a part ofc th.~ 
Idnonesian sovereign state], and then goes ori to make the 
claim that "the government do not, and would not, allow 
the export of arms and equipment which. are likely t-0 be 
used against 1ne civilian population"" and that "this is a 
policy that applies wherever violation of human rights takes 
place". * 
Continued from page 9 
governmen~ e:mployees was also started.,tA briefing session 
for litsus contrnllers in the province was . held by the 
regional miliW'y commander, Maj. Gen. R. Hartorio." 1'tle 
target for these investigations includes job applicants, new . 
appointees, people holding certairi positions, andemployee5 
who have not previously been ·screened, as . well as 
employees of some private enterprises. [Surabaya Post 
28.8.1990] (See separate item for more about litsus.) ~-
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Dili Mass ends in protest 
For the third time in less than a year, ymu;ig East Tin;iorese have demonstrated .in favour · of indep~ndenqe, in Dili, · ~I1 . the 
presence of outsiders. The . occasion this time wa~ an anniversary Mass attended by the Apostolic Nuncio froI11 Jakiuta .. 
On 4 September, huncireds . of East Tin1orese unfurled 
banners saying, "Independence for East Timo~!'', "Lcmg 
Live Fretilin!", , "Long Live the Maubere Peop1e",,and "Long 
Live Xanana!" The demonstration .occurred at the e11d of a 
Catholic Mass in Lecideri, held to commemorate .. th~ . 50t11 
anniversary of the founding of the Dili Diocese. A numbe,r 
of senior officials were present, including Mgr Canalini, the 
Apostolic Nuncio in Jakarta, Bishop Belo, head of the 
diocese, 'provincial' . governor Mario Carascalao and niany 
military and non~military officials. 
As . the Mass drew to a close at. 5.30 pm, the 
demonstrators began their action, with the Slf pp9rt of many 
people. among the more than 20,000 peJ;>ple attending Jh.e 
Mass. The demonstrators made a determined effort to press 
Mgr Canalini to make a statement clarifying the Vatican'~ 
stand on East Timor. [There are strong rumours in East 
Timor that the Vatican may shortly switch its position and. 
support Eas1 Timor's integration into Indonesia.] The , 
demonstration continued for about half an hour, during 
which time Governor Carascalao prevailed on the police not 
to · make any arrests. 
When Canalini left the scene at about 6,00 pm, the 
demonstrators left in defiant mood. On their way home, 
scuffles broke out between demonstrators and Indonesians 
whom they encountered on the streets. When troops arrived 
to push the demonstrators back, they were ·. pelted with 
stones. 
In several places after getting home, the demonstrators 
continued their anti-Indonesia activities until late that night, 
attacking Indonesians in the vicinity and mocking them 
with "Kapan pulang?" ["When are you going home?"] 
Arrests 
The demonstration led to a crackdown. The first arrests 
occurred on 6 September, with more following on 10 and 
13 September. Sources in Dili s~y that t.he situation. in Dili 
is very tense, with Indonesian spldiers in civilian clothing, 
roaming the streets wielding batons, iron bars and other 
implements, beating up people. Things were so bad by mid 
September that Timoresc were afraid to venture out after 
dark.* 
Wounded East Timorese stut;/.f!nts tended by Red Cr()s~ · 
nurses in the garden of Mgr.Belo. 
Parliamentary mission unlikely 
Preparations under way for several years for a Portuguese 
parliamentary mission to visit East Timor appear to have 
come to a halt. Until mid 1990, the Portuguese ,govermµent 
was exuding confidence . that the visit would tcike pla.(:e this · 
year, agreement having been reached between. Portugal anci 
Indonesia about travel and protocol arrangements. ·Tile 
mission's visit to East Timor has for years been the only 
talking point in the negotiations between the two countries 
held in New York under the aegis of the UN Secretary 
General. · · -
Whatever Indonesian diplomats may' have been saying in 
New York however, it is now clear that the generals in 
control on ·the ground have had no intention of allowing the. 
visit · to take . place. It was · reported , in July · !}lat the 
Australian ambas.5ador, Philip Flood, was told duririg a vis.it 
to Dili, that the military anticipate that a visit by Portuguese 
parliamentarians would lead to widespread "social ·unrest'', 
so they could not contemplate such an event taking pJace 
for two or three years. [Diario Noticias, 16.7.1990J 
Portuguese passivity criticised 
Five Portuguese solidarity groups1 . mcluding . the 
Commission for the Rights . of the ¥aub.ere People and 
Peace is Possible in East Timar are strongly critical of the 
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Portuguese government for its passivity on East Timor. In 
a joint statement.i.Jl July, they said the planned visit of the 
parliamentary delegation to East Timor has been used to 
justify such passivity and lack of pol~Hcal will. They 
criticised the government in partictilarfor. inactivity on the 
Timor Gap Treaty and for not proceeding with proposals to 
convene an international parliamentary confere.nce on East 
Timor and paid tribute to the East Timorcse people Who 
have shown more and more courage in refusing to accept 
colonial occupation. [East Timor News No. 37, 8 August 
1990] .... 
R~<;ent in<r!P:ynts in Dili, .cuJn1inating in the .de;i:n,onstrat~on 
on 4.September, show that despite repeated cn1ckdowns and 
dire threats from Minister of Defence, · General Benny 
Ml,l!dani, in .a speech in . J:)ili . on 3 F~l>r~ary [see TAPOL 
Bulletin No .. 99, June 1990], EastTimorese are taking every 
opport11nity to demonstrate against the Indonesian 
occupation. Whatever the Portuguese authorities tlmught the 
visit would achieve, it. was awaited witJ1 great expecta1ion 
in East Timor as · their demand for 
:.'elf-determination. 
UN .motives unclear 
Th.e 1fl1e aims of the visit weie thrown into confusion when 
Achmed Rafeuddin, UN ,.Under Secretary-General with 
re~pons1bi1ity f()l' past 'Tim.or, told a . Japanes~ MP · on 8 
August that if th~ parliamentary mission. took place, this 
would lead to the solution of the issue and the removal of 
EastT!P:1Pl' from the UN agenda. Takemura Yasukp met 
Acnmed ·Rafeuddin whiJe fu New York t.o speak at the. UN 
D~~9)1;misjit~on cOmmittee on tbe questfon of. East Timor. 
Sh~· ·'!J.~~~d . for: jhe meeting to. seek clarifi;g~tj~:m ~bout a 
report in the .Indonesian press claiming that UN Secretary-
Gener~, Peres de Cue11ar had written to President Suharto 
expr~ajngtbe hope . "that East Timor would .soon q:ase to 
be anissue at the .wp~l(j o.rganisation". He also alJe~cdly 
"r~fe~red. to the vast improvenlerits in ipternational relatiop.s, 
ope~ing up. opportunitie~ . for th.e remqval of East Timor 
fi".om tbe UN agenda,". f!akarta Post, . 26 July 1990] While 
~feyq~iP descriqed this. report . as 'fndonesia's 
interpretation', his rp:mark about the. mission.seemed to 
COJJfil111 that this might also be tbe UN's interpretation. 
Li~~oil".on •. Kuwait and East Timor 
lt is difficult to believe that while the UN Se<::llrlty Council 
is p&Ssing .. a stream of resolutions condemning · Iraq's 
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ann.exation of ~uwait, the General Assembly could at its 
se.ssiQn this.. year endorse Indonesia's invasion and 
occupation of East Tim.or. 
In a statement on , 14 September, Portugal's Prime 
Minister, Dr Cavaco Silva, said Portugal would continue to 
campaign for futemational pressure on Indonesia, usfug the 
Gulf crisis to remind the world of its still unsettled dispute 
over East Timor. 
We have to go on putting pressure on the int~fnational 
community so thai the people of Timar can have some hope 
of being able to de~ide their own future. All our 
ambas~·adors have clear instructions on how to proceed in 
making t!ie connection between this violation of 
international law, of which the world is fully aware, and 
that other violation which it sometimes wants to forget. 
Murdani deplores annexation ... of Kuwait! 
Of alJ Indonesian e;.overnment ministers, Gene{'al Benny 
Murdani, .?tJ:ir1ister for Defence aJ1d Security, the man m9st 
clo$ely identified with the, invasion and occupati9n Qf East 
Tfuior, has been most explicit towar9s Iraq. Asked in 
P;lrlfament why the government's policy on the Gulf .crisis 
was unclear, he disagreed and s!l.id that Indonesia officiaJly 
deplores "the ann,exation of a s.111.all country by a big on.e". 
[.Jakarta fo~.t, 12.9.1990] 
Indonesian government policy towards Iraq is influenced 
by severa] considerations; steering a cqurse that will not 
alienate the · Muslim community, not . ~dopting a position 
that will boomerang unfavourably on Indonesia's own 
forcible annexations of West Papua and East Tim()r, and 
weighing up the impact Qf oil price rises on · the . Indonesian 
econoiµy. Th<;rc . is a split within the Muslim community; 
some Muslims sympathise with Saddam's expansionist 
nationalism, some are more sympathetic to Saudi ·. Arabia, 
while others reject the US occupation of Saudi Arabia, the 
site of .the most holy s~r;ipes .·.· of ~~lain.· Wi~h thousap~s 
voluntecrfug to fight for Iraq, the government ha.s warned 
that anyone taking up arms ina foreign co~ntry risks losing 
their Indonesian citizenship . . The government has rejected 
a call from Saudi Arabia. to send troops to the Gulf, sayiJig 
thatlndonesian troops can only be deployed overseas at the 
requ~st of the United Nations. * 
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Indonesia slammed at 
. - ~ 
UN Decolonisation Committee 
Twenty-two petitioners attending this yeaf~ session of the UN Decolonisation Committee on August 
9 called for East Timor's right to self-determination to be exercised. A summary of som~. of these 
stateme1J,ts is given below. The remainder. will follow in the next issue. · 
Indonesia's continued occupation, exploitation and 
oppression of East Timar was the main theme of sub-
missions by non-governmental organisations. Petitioners 
detected no improvement in ,Indonesia's record of ~uman 
rights violations and no let u·p in the killing and torture of 
East T~orese. Many statements referred to . the Gadjah 
Mada University sociologists' report on 'ihe :situation in the 
cciuntry '· such an indictment of the 'occupation, that last 
minute "atte1Ilpts were ma:cJe to hush it up in Indonesia. 
To .illustrate the regime's attempt to crush the indepen-
dence movement, many petitioners quoted · [rom: Defor~ce 
Minister General Benny Murdani's speech to ·officials fa 
Dill, while Bishop ,BeJo's appeal to the UN for a ·referen-dum found continued support. [For details of the Gadjah 
Mada repop and ,Murdani's speech see TAPqJ,,, Bulletir; Nos 
99 and 100, June and August 1990.J The l]N's reaction to 
Iraq's invasion 9f Kuw,ait was compared with its failure to 
foJJow-up the Security Council's · unanimous condemnation 
of the invasion bf East Timor in 1975. This year, for the 
first, time, an Indonesian national was among the East. 
Til1lorese~ Japimese, Canadiilli, Australian and European 
voices calling on the UN to expedite the decolonisation of 
East Timor. 
One big concentration camp 
Alexander George, TAPOL, described how the same basic 
military oppression remained in East Timor a11d 1~o\\' ,recent 
changes, such as the promotion of tourism, were cosmetic: 
Eas.t Timorese refugees · au;iving , recently in Australia and 
Portugal confirmed that East Tiffi.or :was "one fag '''concen-, 
tration camp". He described the · recent military build,:_up 
and outlined new.,,, forms .of resistance . by the ,younger 
generation, to cope with fndonesia''s "hearts and minds" 
strategy. He .cast doupt on . clai.lll's by . f.ndonesia ihat, the 
special m~itary ·• .C<ommand for . ~t Tim or, . "]foopskam 
TimTim had been disbanded. Gadjllh Mada findirigs were 
"one of the most searing indittment;:;_ of Jndonesian rule in 
East Timar to d<!.te"; he commended · the report for careful 
consideration by the Decolonisation Committee. 
... . .. 
Jose Luis Gutt~r~~. FRETIUN, recalled how his move-
ment had resisted the Indonesian invasion of East Timor in 
1975. Afte,r 15 'years of terror, when approximately a third 
Of the population ·had died, fndonesian military forces still 
occupied the country. Over the past year, the youth of East 
Timor has been e.~c0.1Jfag~d by:_tp.e ., victories pf J:ALIN'TIL 
the liberation army, and by changes in the international 
situation, to demonstrate peacefuJJy against the foreign 
occupation, . but the demonstrations were brutally S1:1JlPT~s~d 
by fndonesian troops. Sixty people were injured after 
demonstrations .when US Ambassador John Monjo .visited.,-. 
Jose Luis Gutteres at UN 
East Timor. He appealed tD fodonesia , to stop·· .further 
operations; FRETILIN is prepared to talk \Vith Indonesia 
without pre-conditiDns, and ready to participate . in a 
referendum or free election supervised · by the Ull[. He 
appealed ·. to multinationals noJ to exploit · East Tin19r'( oil 
until a political settlement had been achieved. 
Parliamentarians .speak cmt for East Tim.()·F ..•. . 
Several submissions were" made by members of Parlia.Jlleri:... 
tariaris for East Timor (PET). 
Yasuko Takemura, one of 87 PET members in the 
Japanese Diet, said the ~st. Timorese, ~s the llprimary 
party", should be included in UN tall~s . She drew ·attention 
to fudonesia's population control prograrxune in East Timoi, 
which "is forcibly carried out, in spite of the fact that one-
third of the population there have died under the Indonesia!J 
occupation" and which Tin10rese women regard as "a form 
of genocide". Japanese , PET members regret Japan'~ 
invasion o.f East Timor in the 1940s so~ sh~ ,felt compelled 
to attend the UN on the anniversary of the ~ornbing of 
Nagasaki, when she would nonnallyhe attlie nation-wide 
prayer for peace, because "Iridonesfa.is >rep<;~ting ·thc samr 
sin as we committed in the past." Japan has .riot recognise9 
, the incorporation of East Timor into !nd6nesia. she said. All 
maps and globes in the Japanese Foreign Ministry havea 
line separating East Timor from Indones"ia, fhank.S io" the 
efforts of herself and others, 
Ray Funk, Canadian·. MP, asked. why, when East Tin1or's 
desire for seJf,-,determin!ltion .... was .. 'IJndcl11a6Ie, ,, nations 
/.,,,,.,,,,.,.,. ......... ,., .... ,,{ 
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''silently acquiesced" to Indonesia's occupation. Too few 
were aware of the plight of East Timor while economic and 
geopolitical considerations took precedence over the rights 
of the East Timorese. He referred to Canada's disappointing 
record as the third largest investor in Indonesia, and 
aHacked Western gqvemmen1s for being ''only too happy" 
to sell arms and loan money to Indonesia, wh~e 1here is 
little doubt that "these fun(Js and these weapons have 
assisted Inclouesia to maintain the military occupation of 
East Timor". Comparing East Tip:iorese,. a~d ,n.ative Cana-
dians, . both discrimiuateq against in a colonial relationship, 
he said 1hc "spirit of coloniaJism" will. live on so long as 
humanity continues to subordinaie human rights and 
conserving the environment to economic gain. .· 
As a model . for talks to establish a mechanis,i'A ·whereby 
East Timorese freely express their will, he suggested the 
West Sahara negotiatio11s for UN sµpervis'iol} ofthe deci-
sion-makil)g process. Canadia1i PET members wi1J c011trib-
ute to glbbal efforts 'for justice.iu East Tirrior ·"with renewed 
vigour", to reverse canada's ,;hypocritical'' stance. , ,, 
Laurie · i<'erguson, Australian Labour MP, said he was 
speaking iJ1 an ·unofficial capacity. He dwelt on the massive 
loss of population. If I.he populaiion J1ad grown by the. 2% 
of 1975, Whoh the population was 690,000, today's popula-
tion should be moie than 9:jO,OOO; in fact there are less than 
650;000 people -:- including outsiders - fa East Timm. ''In 
relative terms this is a 1oss of population without equal in 
world 1roubfo sp()t$ siuce the end of World War If". 
East Timar has not prospered under Indonesia; tiie wealth 
is ·controlled by fooor1csians, nof East Timorese. He 
disagreed that East Timor was too small to be independent 
and· JI1cntfoned many smaller independent natfons. The 
agreement between Indonesia and Australia to exploit 
Tinior Gap oil has no provision to share revenues with East 
Timor. AS an, independent country, taking advantage of its 
resources, E;;tst Tu1for, could by now be of similar economic 
standing.Jo 'thy sl,ll~11.$f~\e:, o~ Brunei. 
Rqj Jose Santos SHva, '.Portuguese MP, said t~e aims of the 
16-:-year old democracy .. in Portugal -had n0J been entirely 
fulfilled. Portugal's African . colonies had exercised self-
determination but the rights of the East Timorese are stHJ 
being violated, their lives taken and. their future .curtailed. 
They refuse to give up .their identity, despite Indonesian 
atrocities. He said Portugal would remain bound by its 
responsibility .to safeguard East Timor's self-deterpiinat.ion. 
i>ortugal had no wish to reoccupy East Timor, only to help 
1he East Timorese freely detenninc their fuiure. 
Antonia Maria Pereira~ Portuguese . MP,,. ~ id . fraq 's 
invasion of Kuwait was a "carbon-copy11 of-the Indonesian 
iuvasion. of East Timor, With both aggressors giving the 
same justifications: Tn 1975, the Security Council . ha~ 
adopted .·a resolution ordering Indonesia to withdraw its 
troops, as it has done in the case of Kuwait. How could 
some countries look benevolently on the, [odone,siail action, 
but condeml) I~~q? · · 
Raul Fernando Souselo de Brito, Portuguese MP, con- ' 
demned the denial of self-dcterminati<m ;md ·the violation 
of other human rights in East Timor. The }>orluguese-
fodonesian talkS 'under UN auspices were aimed at findiug 
a just 5oJutiori 1d"the pfoblem of East Timor. · 
' ·. :·. ·' ,·_.,,.,·, .. ·' · .. · .. i'··,' 
Rui Quartin-SantQs; for· the Portuguese government, said 
Portugal was ·not tryiqg to "put back the clock of history"; 
•, "" ., ,~ ·, . f . . . • . ;-. . < ·•• ... ~ ·• 
Portugal's ru]e of East Timor was over, but it had the duty 
to uphold the fundamental rights of East Timor's people. It 
firmly Qe1ieved th.;it East Timor. co~stituted one of the most 
!)erious challenges to t~e- ~applitation ofthe decolonisation 
principles of General Assembly. resolution 1514. Portugal 
would cooperate to achieve a settlement and in that spirit, 
he was participating iJl ta~ aimed at reachiug the terms of 
ref~rence for the visit of ,a PortuIDiese Parliameµtary 
delegation to East Timoc . A .better. ~~~10sphere co,uld be 
created arthe talks if the respect for human rights and basic 
freedoms in East Timor showed signs of improvement, 
which see:ined not fo be the case~ The · Timof Gap Treaty 
was a serious breach of international 'Jaw in contempt of the 
UN and of the sovereign rights of the &st Timorese over 
their natural resources. Portugal reserved the right to resort 
to any legal means deemed appropiiate to uphold these 
rights; * · [To be continued next issueJ 
West Papuan ·Peoples Front at UN 
The Netherlands-based West Papuan Peopies Front spoke 
out against the Indonesiiin exploitation and colonisation of 
West Papua at both the UN Working Group: on Indigenous 
Peoples and at the Sub-Commission on Prevention of 
Discrimination and Protection oi Minorities in Geneva, July 
and August Representative Victor Kaisiepo focused on the 
pro~independe,nce dcmqn~~riition~ of Deqember 1989, after 
~vhic;h eight Papu,ans were refused asylum in neighbouring 
PNG wl1en Indonesia, Australia . and PNG ''conspired to . 
deprive indigenou~ Papuans of th.eir right to safety"~ on 
cpntinuing military operations ag~i11st OPM al the PNG 
border; on the extradition of Mecky Salosa; on the colonial 
nature of Indonesian rule and transmigration; ' on thC 
environmentally destructive n~ture of so-called develop-- · 
ment projects eg. the Freeport copper mine and ·fogging on 
Yapen isfa.nd; and ·on·-the general problem of dispossession 
of tribal lands. The Front also attacked World Wide Fund• 
for Nature's park projects in West Papua for imposing 
restrictions on t11e traditional Ji.fe of. West Papuans. The 
Front called on the UN to acknowledge thc~t West Papuans 
havq l:n::en denied. thY,ir right t() self-d~termination and .to 
put forward demand for this . r~ght to , the Decolonisatiqn 
Committee; to investigate huJI1a~; rights abuses, pressure .t~e . 
Indonesian govemment to legislate against further immigra-
tion . into West Papua and. to prohibit t~e exploitation .of, 
natural resqurces until Papuans are in a position to deter-
mine their national heritage. . .. · * 
. , 
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Loyalty enforced in Aceh 
The Indonesian government has staged a series of propaganda exercises inAceh, aimed at convinci17:g 
a restive and deeply dissatisfied population that they should remain loyal to the Indonesian Republic 
and assist Indonesian tro9ps in their efforts 'to crush the Free Aceh Movement (GAM). 
In recent months, tensions in Aceb have mounted; GAM 
supporters have killed more than 7o.. members of the 
security forces, troops have shot civilians, transmigrants 
have abandoned their sites and work in northern Aceh's 
industrial zone is being held up as Javanese engirieers 'are 
too frightened to return to work. In Jilly, the governor 
announced that more troops would be sent in to tackle the 
unrest. (See TAPOL Bulletin No 100 for background.] 
Over the Jast two months , the authorities have tried 
coercing, pleading and bribing Acehnese to support . them. 
On August 5, 655 villagers from Seuneudon sub-district in 
North Aceh were brought by truck to Lhokseumawe, where 
they read out pledges of allegiance to the Republic and 
Pancasila state before miHtary and government officials; 
They were then made to parade ·· around the town, waving 
red and white Indonesian flags. Tneir villages were accused 
of harbouring GAM leaders. A siege of one of the villages 
in July reportedly ended in the arrest of GAM leaders. 
Other reports speak of "hundreds" of villagers, including 
two GAM commanders, voluntarily returning to "the lap of 
the tndoncsian motherland". They wrote confessions and 
accepted they would be punished under the ·Jaw if they 
broke their pledge of allegiance. Similar allegiance ceremo-
nies have been held in at least two other sub-districts. The 
so-called surrenders are said to be in response to Governor 
of Aceh Ibrahim Hasan's appeal to GAM adherents to give 
themselves up peacefully and they will be "welcomed with 
open arms" by the government. 
Flying the flag 
In August, the Indonesian flag was used in another heavy-
handed attempt to intimidate the population to pledge 
loyalty. In August, Governor Hasan instructed Acehiiese 
families and institutions to display the national flag outside 
their homes from August 4-10 though independence day is 
on the l 71h, warning that those who fail to do so "shall not 
be regarded as republicans". [Jakarta Post August 6~ 1990] 
Aceh's ulamas [teachers of [slam] are among those 
targeted in the loyalty game. In August, regiment com-
mander Colonel Muhammed Chan asked the ulamas to help 
ABRI and later, Abdurrahman Wahid, Chair of Nadhatul 
Ulama, offered to help bring the ulamas round · to the 
concept of Indonesian nationalism and Pancasik 
In East Aceh, the district head has offered to buy the 
loyalty of the population. At an allegiance-swearing 
ceremony in Langsa, he offered Rp 1 million {US $540) for 
every rebel weapon turned in. This is no small amount: as 
noted by the Economist [September 8, 1990] it amounts to 
a year's income for the average Acehnese. 
Everything under control? 
Most government spokesmen contiAue to play down to the 
serious situation in Aceh. After a one-day visit to the 
province, cooperatives minister Bustanil Arifin said only 
one village was not secure and that Aceh was suffering a 
little disturbance from anny deserters and "peace disturbing 
gangs" (GPK). Armed Forces chie.f-of~staff Edi Sudradjat 
went so far as to claim that the problems in Aceh were 
over. [Suara Merdeka, August 6, 1990], a claim QUt of step 
with the regional commanderrs announcement tbat .. the 
armed forces would be able to wipe out the group by the 
end of the year. 
True, there have been fewer reports of GAM attacl<s ,over 
the last two months, but this does not necessarily reflect the 
situation on the ground. While domestic reporting .is largely 
confined to .official propaganda, the foreign press is less 
inhibited. Major business publications such as theFingncia! 
Times [August 2, 1990) have reported the army effort' in 
terms of "winning back0 the support of the Acehnese 
people, and spoke of majority support for the GAM amqng, 
the local people. According to the Economist wpic;h .dou.bts 
the GAM will be finished by the end of the year, ,''the .signs 
are that the activities of the Front [GAM] are incre~sing"* 
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